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Abstract
Einstein considered general covariance to characterize the novelty of
his General Theory of Relativity (GTR), but Kretschmann thought it
merely a formal feature that any theory could have. The claim that GTR
is “already parametrized” suggests analyzing substantive general covari-
ance as formal general covariance achieved without hiding preferred coor-
dinates as scalar “clock fields,” much as Einstein construed general covari-
ance as the lack of preferred coordinates. Physicists often install gauge
symmetries artificially with additional fields, as in the transition from
Proca’s to Stueckelberg’s electromagnetism. Some post-positivist philoso-
phers, due to realist sympathies, are committed to judging Stueckelberg’s
electromagnetism distinct from and inferior to Proca’s. By contrast,
physicists identify them, the differences being gauge-dependent and hence
unreal. It is often useful to install gauge freedom in theories with bro-
ken gauge symmetries (second-class constraints) using a modified Batalin-
Fradkin-Tyutin (BFT) procedure. Massive GTR, for which parametriza-
tion and a Lagrangian BFT-like procedure appear to coincide, mimics
GTR’s general covariance apart from telltale clock fields. A generalized
procedure for installing artificial gauge freedom subsumes parametriza-
tion and BFT, while being more Lagrangian-friendly than BFT, leaving
any primary constraints unchanged and using a non-BFT boundary con-
dition. Artificial gauge freedom licenses a generalized Kretschmann ob-
jection. However, features of paradigm cases of artificial gauge freedom
might help to demonstrate a principled distinction between substantive
and merely formal gauge symmetry.
Key words: general covariance, gauge freedom, clock fields, constrained dy-
namics, theory equivalence, Kretschmann objection
1 Introduction
It has been claimed, starting with Einstein in the 1910s, that general covariance
is the chief novel and distinctive feature of the General Theory of Relativity
(GTR), the great lesson about space-time physics that all theorizing in the
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foreseeable future ought to respect. Whatever the details might be, general
covariance is supposed to involve the absence of certain structures that are im-
pervious to the contents and history of the world. Initially Einstein took general
covariance to be manifested in the admissibility of arbitrary coordinate systems
in GTR. However, almost immediately Erich Kretschmann cast doubt on Ein-
stein’s analysis of general covariance and argued that it was a merely formal
feature of GTR that any theory (of the sort that physicists might reasonably
entertain), including GTR’s predecessors and competitors, could share if formu-
lated with a bit of ingenuity [Kretschmann, 1917; Norton, 1995; Rynasiewicz,
1999; Norton, 2003]. After conceding the truth of Kretschmann’s criticism that
general covariance could be a merely formal property reflective of the theorist’s
ingenuity, Einstein then maintained that GTR was (substantively) generally co-
variant in the special sense that the field equations of GTR took their simplest
form when expressed (formally) generally covariantly, thereby implying that
other theories would look more complicated in that form. Thus Einstein in ef-
fect distinguished formal or weak general covariance from substantive or strong
general covariance, if one may use terms that would arise later [Bergmann, 1957;
Stachel, 1993]. While something seems intuitively right about Einstein’s claim,
the task of analyzing or replacing the “simplest form” criterion for substantive
general covariance thus far has not received a universally satisfying resolution.
Although it is widely believed that there is some unique nontrivial notion of
general covariance that at least roughly captures the main innovation of Ein-
stein’s 1915-6 theory of gravity, perhaps matters are not so simple. Elsewhere
I have discussed the Anderson-Friedman absolute objects program and also a
variational criterion as candidate analyses [Pitts, 2006a, 2008]. The Anderson-
Friedman project appears to fail if one expects that GTR should count as sub-
stantively generally covariant, on account of certain kinds of geometric objects
that are susceptible to absoluteness simply by being nonzero everywhere [Pitts,
2006a, 2008; Giulini, 2007; Zajtz, 1988]. In particular the volume element
√−g
counts as absolute. A variational analysis might be extensionally correct, but
there is some concern that it might give the right answer for the wrong reason
[Pitts, 2008].
A suggestion sometimes made by physicists about GTR, that it is an “al-
ready parametrized theory,” provides another fruitful way to analyze general
covariance. Parametrization involves the use of preferred coordinates as scalar
fields, known as “clock fields” [Lanczos, 1949; Bergmann and Brunings, 1949;
Arnowitt et al., 1959, 1962a,b; Dirac, 1964; Kucharˇ, 1973; Teitelboim, 1973;
Kucharˇ, 1981; Torre, 1992a; Westman and Sonego, 2009; Lopez et al., 2008]. A
parametrized theory will have, in addition to the fields that one might have ex-
pected, a set of n scalar fieldsXA (in n space-time dimensions) which appear (of-
ten differentiated) in the action principle and equations of motion. For example,
a parametrized special relativistic theory will have clock fields in the Poincare´-
invariant combination ηµν =def X
A,µ ηABX
B,ν , where ηAB = diag(−1, 1, 1, 1)
and the comma denotes differentiation with respect to arbitrary coordinates xµ;
the flat metric tensor is reduced to a function of (derivatives of) the clock fields.
Clock fields have recently come to the attention of some philosophers of physics,
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such as John Norton, John Earman and Gordon Belot [Norton, 2003; Earman,
2003a, 2006; Belot, 2007]. The idea behind the phrase “already parametrized”
is that GTR does not need any explicit clock fields because they are already
there, albeit obscured and mixed in with the true degrees of freedom. Hopes for
digging out the clock fields from the metric by a canonical transformation, or
even regarding GTR as literally parametrized without exhibiting the clock fields
explicitly, have diminished somewhat over the years. However, whether clock
fields are already in GTR somewhere does not matter for my purpose of analyz-
ing general covariance. What matters is that no further clock fields are needed
for GTR to achieve formal general covariance. At present it appears that the
absence or presence of (non-redundant [Bergmann and Brunings, 1949]) clock
fields in a formally generally covariant theory correctly tracks expectations that
a theory formulation is or is not substantively generally covariant, respectively,
assuming that all non-variational fields (that is, fields present but not varied
in the action [Gotay et al., 2004]) have been replaced by functions of the clock
fields and their derivatives. Clock fields are preferred coordinates in disguise,
so the criterion that a formally generally covariant theory formulation is sub-
stantively generally covariant just in case it lacks (non-redundant) clock fields
revives the spirit of Einstein’s mid-1910s claim that general covariance involves
the lack of preferred coordinate systems. Most people nowadays agree that
there is nothing very interesting about coordinate systems [Earman, 2006], so
it is surprising that so old-fashioned a criterion turns out to work so well, and
indeed perhaps better than the geometrically sophisticated Anderson-Friedman
project. The absence of clock fields and the absence of fields not varied in the
action principle seem to be not merely coextensive, but very simply related con-
ceptually. The functional form of a parametrized theory’s dependence on the
clock fields determines the theory’s symmetry group in a simple way.
For typical gauge theories such as Maxwell’s electromagnetism, the Yang-
Mills theories of the weak and strong nuclear forces, and Einstein’s theory of
gravity, the presence of gauge freedom follows largely from the locality of the
field theories, the Poincare´ invariance of Special Relativity, and the presence of
a pure spin particle(s) (spin 1, several spin 1, and spin 2, respectively) with no
lower-spin admixture. Lower spin admixtures in special relativistic field theories
tend to give wrong-sign degrees of freedom, such as the time component of a
4-vector, the time-space components of a symmetric rank 2 tensor, and the
like [Wentzel, 1949]. Such negative-energy degrees of freedom can threaten
stability, especially in the presence of interactions. For electromagnetism, the
massive Proca theories avoid gauge freedom. One might expect similar results
for massive variants Yang-Mills theories and GTR, but subtle difficulties arise
[Boulware and Deser, 1972; Pitts, 2009a].
The question whether there exist empirically equivalent but incompatible
theories bears on how tightly empirical constraints from the progress of sci-
ence might constrain our theorizing. While the issue of empirical equivalence
has been widely discussed, philosophers’ discussions often have involved rather
thin examples, perhaps generating new theory candidates by de-Ockhamizing
(replacing one theoretical entity, perhaps “force,” by some combination of mul-
3
tiple entities such that only that combination plays a role in the theory, such
as “gorce plus morce” [Glymour, 1977]), ad hoc deletion of some regions of
space-time or objects therein while the remainder behaves just as in the mother
theory, and the like. It will turn out, surprisingly, that some physically interest-
ing resembles bear some resemblance to de-Ockhamization and that physicists
have elaborate technologies for performing such reformulations. Using physi-
cally interesting examples also has the advantage that fairly detailed principles
for theory identification are already suggested by standard techniques and at-
titudes in physics. Thus there is comparatively little risk that the question of
theoretical equivalence will be resolved one way or another simply by ad hoc
stipulation. Using examples from real physics avoids collapsing scientific under-
determination into familiar extrascientific skeptical worries, as P. Kyle Stanford
has urged [Stanford, 2006]. John Earman recently has made some surprising
claims that certain empirically equivalent theory formulations amount to differ-
ent theories [Earman, 2006]; these claims will be addressed below.
Empirical equivalence is an issue that plays a key role in arguments about
scientific realism. According to Andre´ Kukla,
[t]he main argument for antirealism is undoubtedly the argument
from the underdetermination of theory by all possible data. Here
is one way to represent it: (1) all theories have indefinitely many
empirically equivalent rivals; (2) empirically equivalent hypotheses
are equally believable; (3) therefore, belief in any theory must be
arbitrary and unfounded. [Kukla, 1998, p. 58].
During the heyday of logical empiricism, many influential people denied that
distinct and incompatible but empirically equivalent theories existed [Glymour,
1970]. In particular, Carnap and Reichenbach had no room empirically equiva-
lent theories, given the verificationist criterion of meaning [Reichenbach, 1938;
Carnap, 1959; Mu¨hlho¨lzer, 1991]. But not only W. V. O. Quine’s work [Quine,
1975], but also the revival of scientific realism during the 1960s-70s [Maxwell,
1962], led to a revival of belief that distinct and incompatible but empirically
equivalent theories exist. More recently the view that there do exist rival em-
pirically equivalent theories has been somewhat widely held [Musgrave, 1992;
Kukla, 1993; Earman, 2006], in contrast to the earlier positivist view that em-
pirically equivalent theories say the same thing and so are merely linguistic
variants. This work and a companion piece [Pitts, 2009a] aspire to address the
question of empirically equivalent theories within the context of local classical
and (to some degree) quantum field theories.
The longstanding issues of general covariance and empirical equivalence
are strongly tied to the largely untouched conceptual and technical question
of artificial gauge freedom. Gauge freedom here is broadly construed as a
theory formulation’s having arbitrary functions of space-time in the solution
of the equations of motion. Given a suitable theory formulation that vio-
lates general covariance on some reading or that lacks a gauge symmetry, it
is often possible to construct an empirically equivalent formulation that sat-
isfies that analysis or has a gauge symmetry. The most famous and system-
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atic procedure for installing artificial gauge freedom is the Batalin-Fradkin-
Tyutin procedure (BFT) [Batalin and Fradkin, 1986, 1987; Batalin et al., 1989;
Batalin and Tyutin, 1991], which takes constrained Hamiltonian theory formu-
lations with broken gauge symmetries (expressed technically as “second class
constraints”) as input and yields formulations with unbroken gauge symmetries
(expressed technically as “first class constraints”) as output. The philosoph-
ically interesting spirit can be generalized, as will appear below, not only to
Lagrangian formulations of theories, but to theories that have no constraints.
Given a field theory, one can add additional fields and additional symmetries
(some examples of which will be more interesting than others) to get an em-
pirically equivalent theory formulation. Thus the BFT procedure and similar
techniques provide an algorithm for either constructing formulations exempli-
fying the Kretschmann-type worry that general covariance or gauge freedom is
a merely formal rather than substantive feature of a theory formulation, or for
generating empirically equivalent theories.
Are the results physically interesting examples of empirically equivalent but
incompatible theories? Or are the results merely alternative formulations of
the same theory, as physicists would expect? Making the most natural applica-
tion to electromagnetism, the question becomes: is Proca’s non-gauge massive
electromagnetism (with some definite photon mass) really the same theory as
Stueckelberg’s gauge massive electromagnetism (with the same photon mass),
or are they different theories? The two theory formulations are empirically
equivalent, but might seem ontologically distinct. Proca formulations have four
fields and three degrees of freedom at every spatial point, with no gauge free-
dom, whereas Stueckelberg formulations have five fields and three degrees of
freedom at each spatial point, with gauge freedom. Clearly 4 6= 5 and the ab-
sence of gauge freedom differs from the presence of gauge freedom, so there is at
least some temptation to regard the theories as distinct. The presence of gauge
freedom is often said by particle physicists to be of fundamental significance.
Even if these claims are overstated (as Chris Martin argues with considerable
plausibility [Martin, 2002]), it is noteworthy that gauge freedom by itself fails to
distinguish Maxwell’s massless theory from the Stueckelberg formulation of mas-
sive electromagnetism. Empiricist-minded philosophers might share with most
physicists the view that Proca’s and Stueckelberg’s families of theory formula-
tions are really the same family of theories and that a Proca electromagnetism
with a given mass and a Stueckelberg electromagnetism with that same mass
are the same theory. The fact that one can gauge-fix Stueckelberg formula-
tions to produce Proca formulations provides a technical implementation of the
empirical equivalence of the two families. Alleged ontological differences that
cannot have any empirical consequences and that disappear on gauge-fixing are
not real, one might think. But then the presence or absence of gauge freedom
in massive electromagnetism is not a real feature of the theory, but merely a
conventional choice of formulation. Thus massive electromagnetism is subject
to a Kretschmann-style point: gauge freedom, if not presently initially, can be
installed with a little effort. In installing artificial gauge freedom, I have in
mind especially the classical theory formulated in Lagrangian terms. Quantiza-
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tion can make an important difference, even rendering a classically satisfactory
theory unacceptable under quantization, due to failure of unitarity or renor-
malizability, as is generally believed to be the case of most massive Yang-Mills
theories. Essentially Abelian theories with a mass term for the photon only
[Pitts, 2009a] are probably an exceptional case for which the mass term causes
no difficulty. No such trouble arises for electromagnetism, however.
Whereas the Stueckelberg trick (as it is often called) for installing gauge
freedom into massive electromagnetism is basically an ad hoc or opportunistic
move, it has become clear in recent decades that there is a general systematic
procedure that achieves basically the same result. This is the Batalin-Fradkin-
Tyutin et al. framework [Batalin and Fradkin, 1986, 1987; Batalin et al., 1989;
Batalin and Tyutin, 1991]. The BFT procedure in fact encompasses various
tricks that are employed in standard examples. For massive Yang-Mills fields
(not just the degenerate electromagnetic special case), Stueckelberg’s trick
[Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004] takes a massive theory with broken gauge sym-
metry due to the mass term, and then restores the symmetry with the intro-
duction of one or more compensating fields.
The BFT procedure, strictly construed, has some features that make applica-
tion to massive gravity an unpleasant prospect, but some simple modifications
suggested below yield a procedure that apparently agrees with parametrized
massive gravity with four clock fields. Below I call attention to some disadvan-
tages and limitations of the existing BFT technologies for installing artificial
gauge freedom, and outline simpler procedures of both Lagrangian and Hamil-
tonian varieties. The procedures are illustrated using Proca’s massive electro-
magnetism, where they recover the usual Stueckelberg gauged massive electro-
magnetism rather more directly than does BFT. It is inconvenient that, due to
the ‘boundary condition’ imposed on the new gauge compensation fields, the
usual BFT procedure requires a canonical transformation to restore the typical
velocity-momentum relationship and thus recover the Stueckelberg Lagrangian
density for massive gravity. An alternative Lagrangian-friendly boundary con-
dition is proposed below.
I also outline a more general strategy of installing artificial gauge freedom.
The BFT procedure adds extra fields only to convert theories with second-class
constraints1 into gauge theories with only first class constraints. Furthermore,
the BFT procedure converts all the second class constraints into first class con-
straints. But one might wish to convert only some second class constraints into
first class constraints. More importantly, one might wish to add gauge freedom
1Constraints vanish for all dynamically possible trajectories and arise due to degenerate
kinetic terms that obstruct the Legendre transformation from velocities to momenta. The
term, somewhat confusingly, refers both to the expression that vanishes for dynamically pos-
sible trajectories (but not for all kinematically possible trajectories) and to the vanishing of
that expression. Taking constraints as expressions of the phase space variables (and momen-
tarily forgetting that they have the value of zero), one can take Poisson brackets of pairs of
constraints (and then set the values to zero). Second class constraints have nonzero Poisson
brackets with at least some other constraint(s). First class constraints have Poisson brack-
ets that vanish, perhaps with terms proportional to the constraints themselves, with all the
constraints [Sundermeyer, 1982].
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to theories with no constraints, such as by parametrizing a scalar field theory
[Kucharˇ, 1973, 1981; Rovelli, 2004]. Perhaps one could have both of these goals.
In at least some cases, such goals can be realized with the addition of extra
fields and gauge symmetries.
Knowing of BFT-type procedures, one can show that certain examples of
general covariance or gauge freedom are artificial and formal; this result might
help to determine which, if any, examples are natural and substantive. Standard
gauge-fixing techniques in effect reverse the BFT procedure and so suggest the
theoretical equivalence of pre-BFT and post-BFT formulations. Induction over
telltale signs of BFT-type installation of artificial freedom might help to answer
the generalized Kretschmann objection.
2 Parametrization: Preferred Coordinates as
Clock Fields and the Einstein-Kretschmann
Debate
As Earman notes, clock fields threaten the criterion of no nonvariational fields
as the test for general covariance [Earman, 2006]. While Earman declines to
seek a more refined criterion to exclude theories with clock fields, it seems to
me that the relevant lesson here is that nonvariational fields can be converted
into functions of clock fields and their derivatives. If nonvariational fields can
be reduced to clock fields, then checking for nonvariational fields while per-
mitting clock fields is a criterion bound to fail: one can simply convert any
erstwhile nonvariational fields into functions of clock fields and their derivatives
to get an equivalent formulation lacking nonvariational fields, thus satisfying the
condition for substantive general covariance even in clearly absurd cases such
parameterized field theories in flat space-time. Such a test for general covari-
ance would be like a police search for criminals in a house without guarding the
back door.
It therefore seems that a promising analysis of the assumed substantive
general covariance of GTR can be found in the claim that GTR is “already
parameterized” [Arnowitt et al., 1959, 1960, 1962a,b; Dirac, 1964; Kucharˇ,
1972, 1973, 1981, 1976b,c,a, 1978; Torre, 1992b]. Whereas field theories in
Minkowski space-time (or other pre- or non-generally covariant theories) ad-
mit parameterized formulations with the explicit introduction of clock fields
to serve as preferred coordinates in disguise, and nonrelativistic mechanics
admits treating time as a dynamical variable in terms of some new param-
eter [Lanczos, 1949], such theories do not naturally come in this parameter-
ized form. Originally there was hope that GTR was quite literally already
parameterized, with clock fields built into the theory in such a fashion that,
with sufficient cleverness (likely involving a nonlocal canonical transforma-
tion, use of coordinates based on scalar concomitants of the Riemann tensor,
etc.) one might explicitly identify the clock fields and deparametrize the the-
ory. Parameterized theories display important formal similarities to GTR in
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terms of certain Poisson bracket relationships that tend to strengthen the im-
pression that GTR is already parameterized [Dirac, 1964; Isham and Kucharˇ,
1985]. It turns out that there are certain technical obstacles that exclude
the strongest versions of the claim that GTR is already parametrized [Torre,
1992b; Westman and Sonego, 2009], but there might be plausible senses in
which the claim is true. Given the analogy between parametrized field theo-
ries and GTR, there has been considerable work on parametrized field theories
as a step towards quantum gravity [Arnowitt et al., 1959, 1960, 1962a,b; Torre,
1992b; Dirac, 1964; Kucharˇ, 1972, 1973, 1981, 1978; Torre, 1992a; Lee and Wald,
1990; Ha´j´ıcˇek and Kucharˇ, 1990; Kucharˇ and Stone, 1987; Isham and Kucharˇ,
1985; Sundermeyer, 1982; Cho and Varadarajan, 2006; Varadarajan, 2004, 2007;
Belot, 2007]. Some early works in quantum gravity employed clock fields even
in GTR [Bergmann and Brunings, 1949; Bergmann et al., 1950], but this ap-
proach did not persist. Given the research trends, one might conclude that,
whether GTR is already parametrized in some deep sense or not, at least GTR
is distinctive in admitting arbitrary coordinates without the need to install clock
fields.
In the typical case of a field theory in Minkowski space-time, the parametriza-
tion process (in its simpler Lagrangian version) proceeds as follows. One begins
with the Lorentz vectors, tensors, etc. (here written with capital Latin letters
A, B . . . for the indices, such as ηAB), covariant under the Poincare´ group. One
then transmogrifies them into world (ordinary, coordinate) vectors, tensors, etc.
(here written with small Greek indices µ, ν, . . . ), thus defining their components
for arbitrary coordinate systems using the relevant tensor transformation law.
For the flat background metric, one now has not the matrix diag(−1, 1, 1, 1) but
a Riemann-flat tensor
ηµν = X
A,µ ηABX
B,ν , (1)
where XA is a set of Cartesian coordinates, xµ is a set of arbitrary coordinates,
and the comma indicates partial differentiation. Thus the Lorentz metric ηAB
is replaced by a flat metric tensor ηµν , partial derivatives with respect to Carte-
sian coordinates are replaced with η-covariant derivatives, and so on. For typical
dynamical fields, little change is needed beyond replacing capital Latin letters
with small Greek letters, the installation of η-covariant derivatives, and a (per-
haps trivial) choice of density weight (that distinction being almost trivial at
the Lorentz covariant level because Lorentz transformations have (anti)unit de-
terminant). If an electromagnetic (co)vector potential potential AB is present,
the prudent choice (though not the only possible one) is to change it into a
coordinate covector Aµ (with zero density weight). The Lagrangian density, a
Lorentz scalar, must become a weight 1 scalar density to make the action a
coordinate scalar [Anderson, 1967]. For spinors, which might never have been
discussed in this context, this process is nontrivial; in principle the OP-Bilyalov
formalism should suffice [Ogievetski˘i and Polubarinov, 1965; Isham et al., 1971;
Cho and Freund, 1975; Bilyalov, 2002], but with strong nonlinearity in the clock
field gradients and some mild inequalities restricting the coordinates. The key
step in parametrization, after arbitrary coordinates have been introduced as
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above, is to treat the nonvariational fields such as ηµν not as primitive, but as
derived according to the definition
ηµν =def X
A,µ ηABX
B,ν . (2)
Now the dynamical fields such as the electromagnetic vector potential Aµ are
tensorial, and the clock fields XA with a typically nontrivial relation XA(xµ) to
the arbitrary coordinates xµ achieve formal general covariance. The presence of
the matrix ηAB contracted with the clock field gradients serves as a reminder
that the theory is Poincare´-covariant in terms of the preferred coordinates XA.
(For metrics with nonzero constant curvature, there will be dependence on one
or more of the clock fields themselves, not just the derivatives.) Then one
promotes, or perhaps rather demotes [Kucharˇ, 1973], the preferred coordinates
XA into variational fields in the action principle, which is expressed using the
arbitrary coordinates xµ. Now the clock fields and the dynamical fields enter the
action S[Aµ, X
B] in basically the same fashion, with both Aµ and X
B having
Euler-Lagrange equations
δS
δAµ
= 0,
δS
δXB
= 0 (3)
and being functions of the arbitrary coordinates xµ. (The use of electromag-
netism is merely illustrative.) While much of the work on parametrized field
theories occurs in a Hamiltonian formalism, the Lagrangian formalism is appro-
priate for my purposes and leaner in field variables by doing without momenta.
One readily demonstrates the claim that it does not much matter whether
XA are varied or not, because the Euler-Lagrange equations from varying XA
are identical to the result of using the other fields’ Euler-Lagrange equations
in the generalized Bianchi identities.2 Let the other fields be represented by
a weight w (1, 1) tensor density φαβ [Schouten, 1954; Anderson, 1967; Israel,
1979]. This case is representative of all tensor fields. (Nothing crucial would
change if a connection or spinor field were included, though the details would
vary.) Because the action S is a scalar, it is unchanged under arbitrary in-
finitesimal changes of the coordinates xµ, including the ones generated by an
arbitrary vector field ξµ. Taking this coordinate transformation to have compact
support makes all boundary terms to disappear, including those from pulling
off derivatives from ξµ in £ξφ
α
β = ξ
µφαβ ,µ−φµβξα,µ+φαµξµ,β +wφαβξµ,µ . After
making some rearrangements and using the arbitrariness of ξµ to pull off the
integral sign, one obtains the generalized Bianchi identity
φαβ ,µ
δS
δφαβ
−w ∂
∂xµ
(
φαβ
δS
δφαβ
)
+
∂
∂xα
(
φαβ
δS
δφµβ
− φβµ
δS
δφβα
)
+XA,µ
δS
δXA
= 0. (4)
Letting φαβ be on-shell (that is, letting its Euler-Lagrange equations hold) leaves
XA,µ
δS
δXA
= 0. (5)
2Generalized Bianchi identities are (typically differential) identities that hold among the
Euler-Lagrange derivatives of the fields in the action principle in cases where the action is
invariant are transformations described by arbitrary functions [Sundermeyer, 1982].
9
Clock fields have non-vanishing linearly independent gradients, so
δS
δXA
= 0, (6)
which was to be demonstrated. Nothing important changes if second (or higher)
derivatives of XA are present, as they will be if a background connection is
reduced to a function of clock fields and their derivatives.
Here the explicit form of the fields besides XA ultimately does not matter,
but the simple form of the Lie derivative of scalar fields
£ξX
A = ξµXA,µ , (7)
which is algebraic in the vector field ξµ generating the coordinate transfor-
mation, does the important work. The fact that the background structure (as
picked out by nonvariational fields in the original action) is reduced to a function
of scalar fields and their derivatives immunizes clock fields against the major dif-
ficulty for the Anderson-Friedman program. That program seems to be thwarted
by the fact that certain kinds of geometric objects, including scalar densities of
any nonzero weight and contravariant (tangent) vectors and contravariant vector
densities of any weight except 1, satisfy the absoluteness condition of local diffeo-
morphic equivalence just by virtue of being nonzero [Anderson, 1967; Friedman,
1983; Zajtz, 1988; Pitts, 2006a, 2008].3 Thus the fact that one can set
√−g to 1
in a neighborhood for any metric in any space-time [Pitts, 2006a; Giulini, 2007],
for example, makes this an apparently false positive test for absolute objects, in
that GTR itself counts as having an absolute object and hence not substantively
generally covariant. Likewise the fact that one can set any (nowhere vanishing!)
tangent vector field to have components (1, 0, 0, 0) in a neighborhood of any
point means that one cannot use such a test to distinguish some such fields
as absolute and others as dynamical. (The nowhere vanishing condition im-
plies that the Jones-Geroch dust counterexample fails, because dust can have
holes. A different strategy is required for spinors [Pitts, 2006a], for which it is
typical, but unnecessary [Ogievetski˘i and Polubarinov, 1965; Bilyalov, 2002], to
introduce an orthonormal basis.) The coordinate transformation laws (of which
the Lie derivative gives the infinitesimal form) for different kinds of geometric
objects are various and in some cases have the surprising consequence that all
such fields are locally alike; I have called such geometric objects “susceptible
to absoluteness.” For geometric objects susceptible to absoluteness, such as
(nowhere vanishing) tangent vectors or scalar densities, one cannot using local
sameness up to coordinate transformations to distinguish some as absolute and
some as dynamical. This difficulty for the Anderson-Friedman program [Pitts,
2006a; Giulini, 2007] might be fatal. The use of clock fields as the test for
lack of substantive general covariance, however, relies only on the properties of
3Some relevant results in differential geometry in ([Pitts, 2008]) were first obtained and
supplied by Robert Geroch in relation to the Anderson-Friedman program (private communi-
cation); later it was found that Zajtz had anticipated the results but without reference to the
Anderson-Friedman program [Zajtz, 1988].
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scalar fields, the simplest type of geometric object. It is difficult to imagine that
scalar fields can hold similar nasty surprises; they do not even have a nontriv-
ial transformation law. In the absence of any analogous reason to expect false
positives from clock fields, clock fields seem like a good criterion for the lack of
substantive general covariance.
The functional form of a parametrized theory’s dependence on the clock
fields determines the theory’s symmetry group in a simple way, as a typical
example illustrates sufficiently. The translation subgroup of the Poincare´ group
manifests itself in having only differentiated clock fields in the formulation,
because (XA + cA),µ= X
A,µ for constants c
A. The Lorentz subgroup O(1, 3)
manifests itself in having only the Lorentz-invariant combination of the clock
field gradients XA,µ ηABX
B,ν in the theory formulation, not each gradient by
itself. Not coincidentally, the Poincare´ group is just the group of Killing vector
fields for a flat metric tensor ηµν .
Of late philosophers of physics have taken to discussing parametrized theories
[Norton, 2003; Earman, 2003a, 2006; Belot, 2007]. As John Norton discusses,
Einstein often ascribed to inertial coordinate systems the (objectionable to Ein-
stein) property of acting but not being acted upon; even late in life, when the
concept of geometric object would have been available [Schouten and Haantjes,
1937; Nijenhuis, 1952], Einstein persisted in faulting inertial coordinate systems
[Norton, 2002]. It might be tempting to regard Einstein’s views as outmoded,
and presumably surpassed by more sophisticated projects such as that of An-
derson and Friedman. As John Earman notes, it is widely held that there is
nothing very interesting about coordinate systems [Earman, 2006]. Earman
then proceeds to discuss clock fields as an obstacle to defining substantive gen-
eral covariance, using the example of unimodular gravity. He declines to suggest
yet another notion of general covariance to avoid this problem.
My proposal that the absence of clock fields be used as the test for substan-
tive general covariance can be viewed as taking up Earman’s challenge. Whereas
he ultimately decides that appeals to the notion of gauge-invariant observables
is promising and that further search for a formal criterion for substantive general
covariance is unpromising, both claims are questionable. Concerning the use of
the Rosen-Sorkin Lagrange multiplier trick [Rosen, 1966, 1973; Sorkin, 2002;
Earman, 2006; Giulini, 2007] to produce a formally generally covariant scalar
field theory in Minkowski space-time, Earman judges the resulting formulation
to be a distinct theory from the more usual scalar field theory, to which the
former reduces on gauge-fixing and with which it is empirically equivalent. This
surprising claim that two empirically equivalent scalar field theory formulations
are inequivalent theoretically is based on their having different sets of observ-
ables, in a technical physical sense [Earman, 2006] (presumably in the sense
discussed long ago by Peter Bergmann [Bergmann, 1957, 1961], though the no-
tion of “observable” in the literature is not obviously unified [Sundermeyer,
1982; Healey, 2004; Lusanna and Pauri, 2006; Pons et al., 2009]). Many physi-
cists would have strong intuitions that these pairs of theories are each equiv-
alent (though that judgment is not universal [Giulini, 2007]), largely because
Lagrange multipliers are seen as just a trick to allow the variation of something
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that doesn’t fundamentally need to be varied in an action principle (especially
if the Lagrange multiplier is a geometric object by itself, as opposed to the
time component of a covector as in Maxwell’s electromagnetism, for example).
As Earman himself says [Earman, 2006, p. 3], widely shared intuitions among
physicists should count as data for philosophers of physics, even if such intu-
itions are not decisive. If distinct empirically equivalent theories are so easily
had as Earman suggests, one might worry about the status of some quantum
field theories, such as massive quantum electrodynamics, in which, intuitively,
a single theory is proven to be unitary with one gauge-fixing and renormaliz-
able with a different gauge-fixing [Peskin and Schroeder, 1995, pp. 738, 739].
It might be worrisome if intuitively a single quantum field theory proved on
reflection to bifurcate into two distinct theories, one of which is provably renor-
malizable but perhaps not unitary, another of which is unitary but perhaps not
renormalizable.
The question arises whether one should take having different technical ob-
servables for empirically equivalent theories to shed light on theoretical equiv-
alence, or use it to criticize the notion of observables that Earman employs.
Peter Bergmann, one of the key authors concerning this concept of observables,
regarded as trivial the weak general covariance on which Earman’s point largely
rests [Bergmann, 1957]. The point of Bergmann’s demanding gauge invariance
for observables is to ensure determinism for their time evolution in the context
of GTR; otherwise predictability is lost because changing from one coordinate
description to another equally valid description after time t0 leaves the future
states of the system unspecified [Bergmann, 1961, 1957], even given the past.
This problem is especially familiar to philosophers of physics now due to the
hole argument [Earman and Norton, 1987]. Even though there is a flat met-
ric with a complete set of commuting Killing vector fields that define preferred
coordinate systems in the Klein-Gordon field with the Rosen-Sorkin trick, Ear-
man demands that observables be invariant under all coordinate transforma-
tions. Some of these transformations start with a set of preferred (Cartesian)
coordinates and conclude with non-preferred (non-Cartesian) coordinates; some
others start with non-preferred (Cartesian) coordinates and conclude with pre-
ferred (Cartesian) coordinates; others do neither. Earman is strangely silent
about the role of Killing vector fields for the Klein-Gordon scalar field theory
with the Rosen-Sorkin Lagrange multiplier trick. By contrast, Bergmann would
reject Earman’s criterion for observability, because given a specification of the
past of the system and due attention to the invariant Killing vector fields, the
future coordinatization of space-time already is determined in a preferred way
up to a global Poincare´ transformation at the worst. That Bergmann would say
this follows from his distinction between weak and strong general covariance
and his dismissive attitude toward the former [Bergmann, 1957; Stachel, 1993].
I will quote Bergmann at length from a work that is not readily available:
Look, for a moment, at the familiar Lagrange equations of classi-
cal mechanics. Let us start with some given coordinate coordinate
system (which we may assume has a physical—i.e., operational—
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meaning, quite independently of the dynamics of our mechanical
system). We write down Lagrange’s equations. If we will, we may
pass to a second coordinate system—bearing always a known rela-
tion to the first—and again write the Lagrange equations. We rejoice
that, in a certain well-defined sense, these new equations exhibit the
same structure as the old...and announce that Lagrange’s equations
are “covariant.” This is convenient: it is not profound. This “weak”
form of covariance affords us an efficient way to describe the same
physical motion in any coordinate system that pleases us. We are
not disturbed if in different coordinate systems our equations of mo-
tion look different...for we know they are different descriptions of the
same orbit: we know how to pass from one description to another,
and the operational relation of each to our world. Our theorem [that
covariance disallows predictions], if it were to be interpreted in this
context, would be scarcely worth stating.
The fundamentally trivial nature of this “weak covariance” derives
from the rigidity of the classical metric. When this is relaxed, we
arrive at the deeper notion of “strong covariance”—the proper con-
text for understanding our theorem. For in general relativity it is
one’s task to calculate the metric...as a dynamical variable. We can
take one coordinate system or another for this job, but all that we
can know is the relation of one frame to the other: we do not know
the relation of either to the world. “Strong covariance”, therefore,
contains not only a reference to the structural similarity of an equa-
tion and its transform; it implies as well that one frame is as good a
starting point as another” [Bergmann, 1957, p. 11]. (italics added,
ellipses and underlining in original)
In discussing the Klein-Gordon theory with the Lagrange multiplier trick, Ear-
man ignores the fact that the flat metric’s Killing vector fields pick out preferred
coordinates. They are preferred only up to a global Poincare´ transformation, but
the global nature of the symmetry means that the choice is made only once and
also is encoded in the coordinate expression of the initial data from which one
wants to predict the future [Rovelli, 1991; Pons, 2001]. Thus the predictability
problem that explicitly motivated Bergmann’s definition of observability does
not arise in STR, even if a weakly covariant formulation like the Klein-Gordon
scalar field with the Lagrange multiplier field is used. Thus Bergmann would
reject Earman’s appeal to observability in the technical sense in application to
a scalar field theory in Minkowski space-time with the Rosen-Sorkin Lagrange
multiplier trick. Once Earman’s doubtful observability criterion is diagnosed,
his motivation for regarding the two scalar field formulations as distinct theories
is removed. Given that Sorkin’s scalar field formulation can be gauge-fixed into
the ordinary scalar field formulation as far as the scalar field’s evolution is con-
cerned, there is no evident reason to regard the two as distinct theories. Giulini’s
suggestion that the evolution of the Lagrange multiplier field gives distinct ob-
servable content to the Sorkin formulation [Giulini, 2007] is mistaken (unless one
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imagines observables to be built out of the Lagrange multiplier field!), because
the Lagrange multiplier does not appear in the scalar field equation (and so is
irrelevant in Anderson’s sense [Anderson, 1967; Pitts, 2006a]). Thus one can
leave Pandora’s box closed by retaining the usual practice of identifying theory-
candidates related by gauge transformations and/or gauge fixings. Such a result
is reassuring regarding physicists’ practice in quantum field theory. It might be
interesting to test a criterion for observability by demanding that it yield essen-
tially the same observables for the Lagrange multiplier scalar field formulation as
for the ordinary Klein-Gordon scalar field formulation. The presence of a com-
plete commuting set of Killing vector fields in every model—in short, preferred
coordinate systems—should not be ignored. Cartesian coordinates, though not
necessary for prediction, are certainly adequate [Brading and Brown, 2002].
Earman goes on to consider unimodular general relativity [Earman, 2006].
The Bergmann-inspired criticism of the application of the concept of observables
to theories that surely are not substantively generally covariant indicates that
more work is needed before relying much on differing lists of observables as
Earman does. He contemplates the idea that the use of clock fields “does not
satisfy the spirit of general covariance” and notes that this “complaint invites
us to produce an even stronger version of the requirement of general covariance
than the one proposed here. I would decline the invitation.” [Earman, 2006,
p. 462] By contrast, I accept the invitation and note that Earman’s example of
clock fields is precisely suited to motivate using the absence of clock fields as
the core of the test for substantive general covariance.
The inter-convertibility of clock fields with nonvariational fields addresses
unimodular GTR with clock fields rather nicely, because then, for example,
the formulation of unimodular gravity with clock fields is readily converted
to a formulation with a nonvariational background volume element, which by
Earman’s standards violates substantive general covariance. Given that clock
fields and nonvariational fields are inter-convertible, a criterion for substantive
general covariance that bans nonvariational fields can only succeed if it also bans
clock fields. Thus one might analyze substantive general covariance as follows.
Definition. A field theory is substantively generally covariant just
in case it is formally generally covariant (in the sense of admitting
at least arbitrary infinitesimal coordinate transformations and some
finite transformations near the Lorentz group), lacks irrelevant fields
(in the sense of James Anderson [Anderson, 1967; Pitts, 2006a]),
lacks nonvariational fields and lacks clock fields.
To my knowledge this criterion performs as expected, extensionally, with
perhaps some ambiguity if the gauge XM = xµ is not permitted, as in massive
gravity with gauge freedom [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]; gauge freedom is required
to avoid causality problems. The hesitation in requiring the admissibility of
arbitrary finite coordinate transformations is intended to secure the general co-
variance of a spinor formalism [Ogievetski˘i and Polubarinov, 1965; Isham et al.,
1971; Cho and Freund, 1975; Bilyalov, 2002] that is more parsimonious and per-
haps defined with less demanding assumptions than is the usual spinor formal-
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ism with an orthonormal tetrad. This criterion of lacking clock fields, however,
clearly is at heart much like Einstein’s original claim that GTR was generally
covariant in the sense of admitting expression using arbitrary coordinates. To
the Kretschmann objection that any theory could be so formulated—one can
imagine a counterfactual history in which Kretschmann produces the example
of parametrized field theories in Minkowski space-time in response to Einstein’s
proposal—one could reply on Einstein’s behalf that Kretschmann’s general co-
variance was artificial because it introduced clock fields as a very transparent
disguise for preferred coordinates, whereas GTR does no such thing. Thus there
is some hope for distinguishing the real general covariance of GTR from the ar-
tificial sort.
It is perhaps ironic that so old-fashioned a criterion as the absence of pre-
ferred coordinates, with some modern polish, works better than the more so-
phisticated Anderson-Friedman project and appears to give the desired answers,
at least if one wishes to retain the claim that GTR is substantively generally
covariant. (Sean Carroll’s view has some similar elements [Carroll, 2004], as
does that of Goldhaber and Nieto [Goldhaber and Nieto, 2009].) The absence
of clock fields and the absence of fields not varied in the action principle seem
to be not merely coextensive, but very simply related conceptually in light of
the inter-convertibility of clock fields and nonvariational fields. The claim that
there is nothing much interesting about coordinates is overstated; while it is
true for GTR, it is not true in general, and this very fact sheds light on GTR.
Of course clock fields XA have no exemption from the problem that some man-
ifolds cannot be covered with a single coordinate chart; thus one might need to
piece together generalized clock fields out of multiple charts.
If there is in fact extensional equivalence between the purely variational def-
inition and the parametrized definition of substantive general covariance, there
is no need to choose between them if one merely wants to classify a given theory
as substantively generally covariant or not. Elsewhere I suggested that the vari-
ational formulation gives the right answer for perhaps the wrong reason in the
case of GTR [Pitts, 2008]. Does a similar worry arise for clock fields? While I
admit surprise that the sophisticated Anderson-Friedman analysis fails and the
simple coordinate analysis of the early Einstein essentially succeeds, presently
I see no objection to taking the absence of clock fields (and irrelevant fields
and nonvariational fields) as an adequate analysis of general covariance, if there
is one. Once one bans nonvariational fields and irrelevant fields, formal gen-
eral covariance without clock fields apparently does imply substantive general
covariance.
The parametrized form of a certain massive variant of GTR [Freund et al.,
1969; Schmelzer, 2000; Arkani-Hamed et al., 2003; Pitts and Schieve, 2007] be-
low will further illustrate the wisdom of using clock fields as a test for general
covariance. Installing artificial gauge freedom by parametrization at least for-
mally restores many features of GTR that one might associate with substantive
general covariance: gauge freedom, point individuation questions such as appear
in the hole argument, the absence of non-variational fields in the Lagrangian
density, a vanishing Hamiltonian apart from boundary terms, etc. It is by no
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means clear that massive variants of GTR are physically acceptable, it should
be noticed, due to worries about stability. This question will be discussed a
bit more below. However, it is not crucial that massive gravities be physically
acceptable in order to make the conceptual points discussed here.
As a further example of the power of clock fields to simulate substantive
general covariance in a deceptively plausible way, one might consider GTR as
formulated with an ADM split of space-time into space and time [Misner et al.,
1973], which introduces a temporal foliation. One can add the time foliation
as a new scalar field T , varied in the action principle, at no cost, because the
resulting Euler-Lagrange equation is entailed by the others. One now has the
ingredients for building lots of new theories using 3-dimensional entities, which
in turn are defined using 4-dimensional tensors and T . Of course most of these
theories, unlike GTR, will make ineliminable reference to T and contain absolute
simultaneity observably. But the theories’ Lagrangians are built entirely using
4-dimensional tensors and the ‘scalar’ clock field T . Clearly introducing the
clock field T into the theory evacuated the 4-dimensional symmetry of content
while preserving it formally. Given that clock fields are such outstanding tools
for subverting otherwise promising criteria for substantive general covariance,
it seems advisable (assuming that one has already converted all nonvariational
fields into clock fields) to understand substantive general covariance in terms of
the absence of clock fields.
3 Artificial Gauge Freedom
It is well known that many important physical theories have considerable de-
scriptive redundancy. The gauge theories for the four fundamental forces—
Maxwell’s electromagnetism, the Yang-Mills theories for the weak and strong
nuclear forces, and GTR—display this descriptive redundancy. Though gauge
freedom arguably has a deep philosophical significance of some kind, gauge
freedom poses something of a challenge technically. In some contexts, especially
Maxwell’s electromagnetism or its quantum successor, it can be useful to make
a conventional choice of a specific gauge, make calculations in a convenient fash-
ion, and then show that the results did not depend on that specific gauge choice
[Weinberg, 1995, p. 345]. Unfortunately this simple procedure tends to fail
for Yang-Mills theories due to the Gribov ambiguity [Sundermeyer, 1982; Kaku,
1993; Guay, 2008]; this failure can be relevant when nonperturbative effects mat-
ter. A more elegant, but more abstract and technically difficult procedure, is to
work with a space of physically distinct configurations by taking gauge equiva-
lence classes; the resulting reduced phase space (in a Hamiltonian formalism) or
other reduction to the “true degrees of freedom” might be difficult to find or use
explicitly, however. These sorts of procedures take gauge freedom to be an ob-
stacle to overcome. Thus Freund, Maheshwari and Schonberg (FMS) discussed
how the absence of gauge freedom in their massive variant of GTR made it easier
to quantize than GTR [Freund et al., 1969]. One can take the second-class con-
straints as identities for eliminating unnecessary field variables [Sundermeyer,
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1982; Weinberg, 1995]. In terms of the Dirac-Bergmann constrained dynamics
[Baaklini and Tuite, 1979; Marzban et al., 1989; Pitts, 2006b], massive GTR has
only second-class constraints and thus makes the true degrees of freedom avail-
able almost immediately in terms of Dirac brackets (which generalize Poisson
brackets), at least in principle. However, for many theories there are tech-
nical challenges involved in working with only the true degrees of freedom
[Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992; Banerjee et al., 1995; Park and Park, 1998],
such as that (i) Dirac brackets tend to be nonlocal and field-dependent, (ii) for
quantization, finding a suitable factor ordering (recalling that qp − pq 6= 0 in
quantum mechanics) is often difficult or perhaps impossible, and (iii) finding
a complete set of variables to form canonical pairs is often difficult or perhaps
impossible.
The pragmatic challenges in dealing with Dirac brackets and the progress
in handling gauge theories have led to a change of viewpoint. More recently
the view has appeared that gauge freedom is an asset and not so much a
liability. Thus technologies have been developed to take theories with con-
straints but no gauge freedom (of which the FMS and other massive gravities
are examples [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Ogievetskii and Polubarinov,
1966; Freund et al., 1969], as are the Proca massive electromagnetisms) and in-
stall gauge freedom artificially by adding extra fields and extra symmetries
ensuring that the extra fields make no empirical difference. While the ad
hoc Stueckelberg trick developed gradually in the middle of the 20th century
[Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004], and a paper from the 1970s left the name “Wess-
Zumino fields” for certain purposes [Wess and Zumino, 1971; Neto, 2006], the
subject of installing artificial gauge freedom reached a mature form in the 1980s
[Faddeev and Shatashvili, 1986; Batalin and Fradkin, 1986, 1987; Batalin et al.,
1989; Batalin and Tyutin, 1991] and now bears the names of Batalin, Fradkin
and Tyutin, or BFT for brevity. This sort of technique has been applied to
both Proca’s massive electromagnetism, and for a nontrivial test case, mas-
sive Yang-Mills theories (notwithstanding the apparently defective character of
most such theories under quantization) [Kunimasa and Goto¯, 1967; Slavnov,
1972; Shizuya, 1975b,a; Grosse-Knetter, 1993; Banerjee and Barcelos-Neto,
1997a,b; Kim et al., 1997; Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004]. I anticipate that
application of the BFT procedure to massive gravities with 6∞3 degree
of freedom [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Ogievetskii and Polubarinov,
1966; Freund et al., 1969] would reproduce the result of parametrization with
clock fields [Schmelzer, 2000; Arkani-Hamed et al., 2003; Pitts and Schieve,
2007], apart from some issues to be discussed below. Such tech-
niques are usually formulated in a Hamiltonian context, where the well-
developed Dirac-Bergmann constrained dynamics formalism [Sundermeyer,
1982; Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992; Earman, 2002, 2003b] allows one to speak
of BFT “conversion” of second-class constraints into first-class constraints.
There has also been a bit of work in a Lagrangian context [Park and Park,
1998; Kim et al., 1999]. The Lagrangian formalism provides considerable help
in guessing correct answers. Given the conceptual distinction between the con-
text of discovery and the context of justification [Reichenbach, 1938], one need
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not be ashamed of a guess-and-check procedure when systematic treatment is
difficult. Here there are two advantages. First, the Lagrangian formalism in-
troduces only half as many new fields as the Hamiltonian formalism: new fields
but not new conjugate momenta. Having no new momenta can significantly
reduce the number of candidate terms in the power series expansion of the new
piece of the Lagrangian as opposed to the new piece of the Hamiltonian. Second
and perhaps even more importantly, the manifest Lorentz covariance of the La-
grangian formulation of relativistic theories still further reduces the number of
candidate terms. In general I will limit attention to Hamiltonian formulations
of theories, but I prefer Hamiltonians related by Legendre transformations to
Lagrangians with the usual symmetries (gauge invariance, Lorentz covariance,
etc.) manifest when possible. (GTR might be an exception, but recently the for-
tunes of the Hamiltonian treatment of Einstein’s ΓΓ Lagrangian have drastically
improved [Kiriushcheva et al., 2008].) Below I will make use of a Lagrangian
‘lucky guess’ in installing artificial gauge freedom for FMS massive gravity. The
availability of a Lagrangian constraint stabilization algorithm analogous to the
Dirac-Bergmann Hamiltonian algorithm [Pons and Shepley, 1995] implies that
at least some cases can be treated directly via Lagrangian means.
The typical BFT procedure goes along these lines: start with a Hamilto-
nian theory (formulation) with m second-class constraints and no first-class
constraints. Introduce m2 pairs of new coordinates θ that are canonically con-
jugate (in a slightly generalized sense). Take the original (second-class) con-
straints and Hamiltonian as the zeroth order terms in a series expansion involv-
ing the new fields θ. Choose the coefficients in the series to make all constraints
first-class and make them have vanishing Poisson brackets with the Hamilto-
nian [Batalin and Fradkin, 1986, 1987; Batalin et al., 1989; Batalin and Tyutin,
1991; Vytheeswaran, 1994, 2002]. Given the series expansion, the original for-
mulation is recovered in the limit that the new fields vanish. One can count the
degrees of freedom to show that the new formulation has the same number as
the old. Given l configuration variables (and hence 2l phase space variables),
f first-class constraints, and s second-class constraints in a theory formulation,
there are 2l−2f−s2 degrees of freedom [Henneaux and Teitelboim, 1992]. For the
original formulation, there are 2l−2·0−m2 =
2l−m
2 degrees of freedom. For the new
formulation, there are (2l+m)−2m−02 =
2l−m
2 degrees of freedom, the same as for
the original. The new formulation with first-class constraints presumably allows
gauge transformations to achieve θ = 0, so the new formulation can be gauge-
fixed into the old one by choosing θ = 0 (unless some physical principle would
be violated thereby, such as causality as in massive gravity [Pitts and Schieve,
2007]).
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4 Modified Batalin-Fradkin-Tyutin Procedure
Gives Stueckelberg Formulation Directly
The most compact and perspicuous way to begin a technical discussion of a clas-
sical field theory is to exhibit its Lagrangian density, a function of some fields
and their derivatives, such that the space-time integral of the Lagrangian den-
sity L, the “action” S of the theory, satisfies the principle of least (or perhaps
merely stationary) action. The source-free Maxwell field equations (in mani-
festly Lorentz-covariant form) follow from a Lagrangian density of the form
L = −1
4
FµνF
µν , (8)
where the indices are moved using the Lorentz metric diag(−1, 1, 1, 1) and
Fµν =def ∂µAν − ∂νAµ is the electromagnetic field strength. For Maxwell’s
theory, the vector potential Aµ admits the gauge transformation
Aµ → Aµ + ∂µφ
for an arbitrary function φ; this transformation makes no observable differ-
ence. This Lagrangian density is manifestly gauge invariant, because it is built
from the gauge-invariant field strength only. For the massive Proca electromag-
netisms, the Lagrangian density is
Lp = −1
4
FµνF
µν − m
2
2
AµA
µ. (9)
Evidently the A2 term breaks the gauge symmetry in the massive case. Whereas
Maxwell’s theory has 2 degrees of freedom at each spatial point (written as 2∞3
degrees of freedom), Proca’s theories have 3∞3 degrees of freedom.4 The ex-
tra degree of freedom (at each point), however, is weakly coupled for small
photon masses and so is not readily noticed experimentally. The treatment
of the two theories (or theory types) using the Dirac-Bergmann constrained
dynamics formalism is straightforward [Sundermeyer, 1982]. The approximate
empirical equivalence between Maxwell’s theory and Proca’s theories for small
enough photon masses is preserved under quantization: massive quantum elec-
trodynamics (QED) approximates the standard massless QED arbitrarily well
[Belinfante, 1949; Glauber, 1953; Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955; Stueckelberg,
1957; Boulware and Gilbert, 1962; Boulware, 1970; Goldhaber and Nieto, 1971;
Slavnov and Faddeev, 1971; Boulware and Deser, 1972; Slavnov, 1972; Shizuya,
1975b; Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004; Goldhaber and Nieto, 2009]. In thermal
contexts, where one might expect the third degree of freedom to be relevant,
4The reader will observe the importance of distinguishing 2∞3 from 3∞3, notwithstand-
ing rules for Cantorian transfinite arithmetic [Moore, 1990]. The lesson seems to be that
physical theories involve continuity properties of sets from which cardinality abstracts. Evi-
dently cardinality does not exhaust the useful notions of “same size” or counting for infinite
collections.
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it decouples in the massless limit, so that the time to reach equilibrium is in-
versely related to the photon mass. As the mass goes to zero, a system takes
forever to reach equilibrium; hence equilibrium thermodynamic quantities based
on three field degrees of freedom are physically irrelevant and unobservable
[Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955; Goldhaber and Nieto, 1971]. It follows that in a
world with electromagnetism as the only force, it would be impossible for fi-
nite beings to rule out all of the massive electromagnetic theories empirically,
and thus impossible to determine empirically whether gauge freedom was a
fundamental feature of the electromagnetic laws. Here I am forgetting about
the Stueckelberg formulation to be discussed shortly, which shows all the more
strongly that gauge freedom per se is not even distinctive of massless electro-
magnetism, unless one bans certain extra gauge compensation fields.
Given the starring role playing by Maxwell’s electromagnetism, Yang-Mills
theory, and Einstein’s gravity in contemporary physics, and consequently the
non-negligible importance of their massive cousins (whether those theories are
physically viable or not), it seems reasonable to seek a procedure for converting
non-gauge formulations into gauge formulations that is as convenient as possible
for massive electromagnetism, massive Yang-Mills theory, and massive GTR. In
the electromagnetic and gravitational cases, it turns out that the gauge for-
mulations were found in an ad hoc way without the need for such elaborate
conversion algorithms as have appeared in recent decades. In the electromag-
netic case, the answer is Stueckelberg’s trick, which adds the gradient of a new
scalar field to the vector field Aµ in the mass term; adding such a term in the
kinetic term − 14FµνFµν would make no difference because such a term, like a
gauge transformation, has no effect on Fµν = ∂µAν −∂νAµ. In the gravitational
case, the answer is parametrization, whereby preferred coordinates are turned
into new fields varied in the action principle. One hopes that parametrization
reproduces the outcome from a BFT-type procedure, though a full direct non-
linear calculation seems never to have been done. (In fact one would expect the
relationship to be somewhat indirect, for reasons to be discussed shortly.) For
the Yang-Mills works cited above, it turns out that the answer is too complicated
to guess easily, but the problem yielded to systematic treatment.
The usual BFT procedure makes no use of a “polarization” of the phase space
into configuration and momentum variables, a fact that adds some generality
but leaves the results a bit more complicated than is necessary for use in some
paradigmatic cases, such as Proca or massive Yang-Mills theories. Whereas
one often sees the BFT procedure yield the Stueckelberg formulation of massive
electromagnetism only after a rather elaborate calculation involving a canon-
ical transformation to implement a change of variables, path integration, and
dropping a boundary term [Banerjee and Banerjee, 1996; Vytheeswaran, 1999;
Banerjee et al., 1995], I will now discuss a modified BFT formalism that directly
recovers the Stueckelberg version of massive electromagnetism. The modifi-
cation involves making a distinction between coordinates and momenta in a
fundamental way, for both the original field variables and the additional ones
added to install gauge freedom. While some generality might be lost thereby,
there is a formal simplification that might be important in applications, such
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as gravitation. It was a considerable achievement in 1958 when it was found
how to trivialize the form of the primary constraints in canonical GTR [Dirac,
1958; Anderson, 1958], though it has been shown recently that perseverance
with the manifestly Lorentz-covariant Einstein ΓΓ Lagrangian quadratic in the
Christoffel symbols has some benefits [Kiriushcheva et al., 2008]. The modifica-
tion made herein to the BFT procedure respects this achievement of trivializing
the primary constraints by leaving the primary constraints alone. It also distin-
guishes among the new fields a set of new coordinates and new momenta. The
result is more Lagrangian-friendly than is the usual BFT procedure, as well as
pedagogically simpler. It is optimized for convenience in paradigm cases, but
might suffer in generality, however.
From a Lagrangian point of view, one wants to recover the second-class
formulation from the first class formulation by imposing the vanishing of new
coordinates (such as the Stueckelberg scalar) and their time derivatives (‘veloc-
ities’), rather than the vanishing of new fields and momenta. The mathematical
details will make this discussion clearer; they also serve as a review of relevant
parts of the Dirac-Bergmann constrained dynamics formalism [Sundermeyer,
1982]. For the massive Proca electromagnetism, the Lagrangian density is
Lp = −1
4
FµνF
µν − m
2
2
AµA
µ.
Here as elsewhere I used the −+++ signature, letting Greek indices run from
0 to 3 and Latin indices from 1 to 3. The primary constraint (at each point) is
pi0 =
∂Lp
∂A0,0
= 0.
Performing the Legendre transformation to get the canonical Hamiltonian den-
sity (not a redundant term in the constrained dynamics literature [Sundermeyer,
1982]) gives
Hpc = piαAα,0 − Lp = 1
2
(pia)2 + piaA0,a +
1
4
FijFij +
m2
2
(Ai)
2 − m
2
2
(A0)
2.
Using the canonical Hamiltonian
∫
d3xHpc (or the primary Hamiltonian—it
does not matter) to find the time evolution of pi0 and to enforce its continued
vanishing gives
{pi0(y),
∫
d3xHpc(x)} = pia,a (y) +m2A0(y) ≈ 0.
Thus the secondary constraint is pia,a+m
2A0 everywhere. Demanding that the
secondary constraint be preserved by the time evolution requires the use of the
primary Hamiltonian Hpp = Hpc +
∫
d3xv(x)pi0(x), where v is a new Lagrange
multiplier. Preserving the secondary constraint (with the help of an arbitrary
test function to smear the Dirac delta functions from the fields’ Poisson brackets
as needed) gives
{pia,a (y) +m2A0(y), Hpp} = −m2Ai,i+m2v ≈ 0,
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fixing v and leaving no arbitrariness in the evolution of the system. The Poisson
brackets of the constraints among themselves are
{pi0(x), pi0(y)} = 0,
{pi0(x), pia,a+m2A0(y)} = −m2δ(x, y),
and
{pia,a+m2A0(x), pii,i+m2A0(y)} = 0.
The vanishing Poisson brackets here vanish without the use of the constraints
themselves. The matrix of Poisson brackets of constraints has non-vanishing
determinant, so the theory is indeed second-class as advertised.
How does the constrained dynamics treatment of the Stueckelberg gauge
formulation of massive electromagnetism differ? The Lagrangian density is
Ls = −1
4
FµνF
µν − m
2
2
(Aµ + ∂µφ)(A
µ + ∂µφ).
As with clock fields, it does not matter if the Stueckelberg scalar φ is varied or
not. The reason is that the gauge transformation formula for the Stueckelberg
field φ is algebraic in the gauge parameters (as is also the case for massive Yang-
Mills [Banerjee and Barcelos-Neto, 1997b] and for massive gravity [Schmelzer,
2000; Arkani-Hamed et al., 2003; Pitts and Schieve, 2007]). If φ is not varied,
then its erstwhile equation of motion will still follow from the Euler-Lagrange
equation for Aµ, either using the generalized Bianchi identity or by simply taking
the divergence. Turning to the Hamiltonian formalism, the primary constraint
is pi0 = ∂Ls
∂A0,0
= 0, as before; the momenta for Ai are also unchanged. The new
momentum for the new field φ is
P =
∂Ls
∂φ,0
= m2A0 +m
2φ,0 ,
so the vanishing of the new momentum (part of the BFT boundary condition)
and the vanishing of the new field’s time derivative (part of the new boundary
condition proposed here) are in general incompatible. Performing the Legendre
transformation to get the canonical Hamiltonian density gives
Hsc = 1
2
(pia)2+piaA0,a+
1
4
FijFij+
m2
2
(Ai)
2+
P 2
2m2
−A0P+m2Aiφ,i+m
2
2
(φ,i )
2.
Preserving the primary constraint yields the secondary constraint
pia,a+P ≈ 0.
Preserving the secondary constraint gives neither a fixed Lagrange multiplier
v nor a tertiary constraint. The primary constraint, being unchanged, still
Poisson-commutes with itself. The new secondary constraint also Poisson-
commutes with itself. Most importantly, {pi0(x), pia,a+P (y)} = 0, so the
Stueckelberg formulation is first class, as advertised. This is the same Poisson
22
bracket algebra as in the Maxwell theory. One advantage of the Stueckelberg
formulation of massive electromagnetism over the Proca formulation is the ease
of taking the massless limit [Zinoviev, 2007]; the gauge freedom remains, while
the extra degree of freedom decouples as m→ 0.
Comparing the secondary constraints of the two formulations is illuminating.
For the Proca formulation, the secondary constraint is pia,a+m
2A0, whereas the
secondary constraint for the Stueckelberg formulation is pia,a+P. If one pretends
that the Stueckelberg formulation has been produced by the usual BFT proce-
dure with the boundary condition of getting the old formulation when the new
fields all vanish, then one should expect the new constraints to reduce to the
old ones once the new fields φ and P are set to 0. The primary constraint, being
unchanged, satisfies this expectation, but the secondary constraint does not:
pia,a+P becomes pi
a,a+0 6= pia,a+m2A0. This result is disappointing, if one
hoped that the BFT procedure would reproduce conveniently the Stueckelberg
formulation. On the other hand, the relation P = m2A0 +m
2φ,0 already told
us that the vanishing of the new momentum P generally is inconsistent with the
vanishing of the new velocity φ,0 , as was noted above. Perhaps one could cir-
cumvent this problem with a canonical transformation, but why work so hard?
Another response to this difficulty would be to replace the BFT boundary con-
dition that new constraints reduce to the old ones when the new fields (here φ
and P ) vanish, with the condition that the new constraints reduce to the old
ones when those new fields that appear in the Lagrangian density vanish (here φ)
and the appropriate relation between the new momenta and the new velocities
holds. The relation between the new momenta and the new velocities arises,
from the Hamiltonian angle, from the equation of motion φ,0=
δHs
δP
: the func-
tional derivative of the new Hamiltonian with respect to the new momenta is
made to vanish. Thus I propose imposing φ = 0 and δHs
δP
= 0, rather than φ = 0
and P = 0, as the means to recover the Proca formulation by gauge-fixing the
Stueckelberg formulation. Imposing my conditions makes the Stueckelberg sec-
ondary constraint and Hamiltonian reduce to the Proca secondary constraint
and Hamiltonian, as desired. One can also consider whether a set of extra
conditions suffices to fix the gauge by forming, along with the primary and
secondary constraints, a matrix of Poisson brackets with non-vanishing deter-
minant [Sundermeyer, 1982]. It is easy to show that the conditions φ = 0 and
P = 0 fail to gauge-fix the Stueckelberg formulation because the resulting four
conditions pi0, pia,a+P, φ = 0 and P = 0 fail to form a matrix of Poisson
brackets with non-vanishing determinant. By contrast, my conditions φ = 0
and δHs
δP
= 0 do fix the gauge. In general my proposal involves making a fun-
damental distinction among the new fields between new coordinates and new
momenta, unlike the usual BFT procedure.
One might not like the fact that the BFT procedure sometimes changes the
primary constraints. In the Stueckelberg formulation (not resulting from the
BFT procedure), it was clear above that all the old momenta are unchanged
relative to the Proca formulation, and indeed relative to the massless Maxwell
case. Given that primary constraint pi0 has vanishing Poisson bracket with it-
self, all the non-vanishing Poisson brackets that make the Proca formulation
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second-class in Hamiltonian form evidently involve the secondary constraint
pia,a+m
2A0. Clearly it is no fault of the primary constraints that the Proca
theory has second-class constraints, then. So why modify the primary con-
straints, if one can avoid it? Leaving the primary constraints unchanged should
also remove some of the arbitrariness inherent in the BFT procedure. If the pri-
mary constraints are left unchanged, then the change in the Hamiltonian entails
a definite change in the secondary (and higher order, if any) constraints.
One can derive, honestly and simply (with no dropping of boundary terms,
field redefinitions through canonical transformations, or functional integration),
the Stueckelberg formulation starting with the Proca formulation. Retaining
the old primary constraints and introducing one new field and corresponding
new momentum, one makes an unknown change in the Hamiltonian ∆H, and
hence a corresponding change in the secondary constraints. Then one seeks the
following: the dynamical preservation of the new secondary constraints by the
new Hamiltonian, the first-class nature of all constraints in the new formulation,
and the boundary condition that the vanishing of the new coordinate only (not
the new momentum) and the vanishing of the derivative of the new Hamiltonian
with respect to the new momentum gives the Proca Hamiltonian. The resulting
Poisson bracket algebra is the same as in Maxwell’s theory. Making an inverse
Legendre transformation from the gauged Hamiltonian formulation yields pre-
cisely the usual Stueckelberg Lagrangian. It would be of interest to apply the
modified BFT procedure to Yang-Mills theories as well.
While the treatment in this section has been classical, the major physical
(as opposed to philosophical) benefits of installing artificial gauge freedom to
convert the Proca formulation into the Stueckelberg formulation lie in quantum
field theory. As noted in the papers cited above, the propagators for the Proca
formulation have bad high-energy behavior, but the Stueckelberg formulation
avoids that difficulty. Whether such an issue would arise in some future formula-
tion of quantum field theory that avoids some of the crutches that seem difficult
to do without at present, if there is one, would be interesting to know. The
philosophical benefits include providing a tractable yet interesting and physi-
cally realistic illustration of a generalized Kretschmann objection. If Proca’s
non-gauge electromagnetism can be reformulated into Stueckelberg’s gauge ver-
sion, the significance of the gauge freedom of Maxwell’s electromagnetism is less
clear. Hints have been given for answering this objection also.
5 Gauge Freedom in Massive Gravity: An Ex-
ternal Symmetry
Whereas the previous section considered internal symmetries, for which each
point lives a life by itself, there are other symmetries in which gauge transfor-
mations link what goes on at different space-time points. The most famous of
these are the “external” space-time diffeomorphisms. Less famous but quite im-
portant are the transformations of supersymmetry, in particular of supergravity
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[van Nieuwenhuizen, 1981], in which internal and external symmetries are com-
bined. Also of interest are the gauge transformations of Einstein’s equations on
a background, which are a symmetry distinct from diffeomorphisms but sharing
some of their mathematical features [Grishchuk et al., 1984; Pitts and Schieve,
2004; Petrov, 2008]. Thus “internal” and “external” symmetries are neither
cleanly mutually exclusive (being in some cases mixed together5) nor exhaus-
tive.
There is a large and growing literature on massive gravities
[Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Freund et al., 1969; Boulware and Deser,
1972; Vainshtein, 1972; Visser, 1998; Karch et al., 2001; Deffayet et al., 2002;
Pitts and Schieve, 2007; Zinoviev, 2007], much of it addressing whether
they approach (local) empirical equivalence with Einstein’s equations in the
massless limit and are theoretically healthy, even at the classical level. A
widely held view since the early 1970s poses a dilemma [Boulware and Deser,
1972; Tyutin and Fradkin, 1972] asserting that massive gravities either have
5∞3 degrees of freedom (spin 2) and do not agree with Einstein’s equations
in the massless limit due to the van Dam-Veltman-Zakharov discontinuity
[van Dam and Veltman, 1970, 1972; Zakharov, 1970], or they have 6∞3 degrees
of freedom (spin 2 and spin 0) and agree empirically with Einstein’s theory
in the massless limit (at least classically), but are theoretically unhealthy and
physically unstable because the spin 0 field has negative kinetic energy. This
view has been challenged in recent years [Visser, 1998; Babak and Grishchuk,
2003]. Whereas the Proca theory is the unique local linear massive variant of
Maxwell’s electromagnetism, the most famous massive gravity with 6∞3 degrees
of freedom, the FMS massive gravity [Freund et al., 1969; Boulware and Deser,
1972; Logunov, 1998], is just one member (albeit the best in some respects) of a
2-parameter family of massive theories of gravity [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov,
1965; Ogievetskii and Polubarinov, 1966], all of which satisfy universal coupling
[Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. Whether massive gravities are viable even at the
classical level remains a matter of debate in the physics literature. Evidently
intuitive expectations about the ease of constructing approximately empirically
equivalent theories to GTR are threatened by devils (or rather, ghosts, implying
negative energies or negative probabilities) in the details, but the arguments
are not yet conclusive. Standard theorems about the disastrous character of
negative energy degrees of freedom do not apply if the Hamiltonian is not
separable into the sum of a function of the momenta and and a function of
the coordinates [Morrison, 1998]. Massive variants of GTR do not display
that simple form [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. Even some Hamiltonian theories
that are separable and that have negative energy degrees of freedom can
be stable in the absence of resonances [Meyer et al., 2009, p. 81]. Plasma
physicists had considerable experience making detailed investigation of systems
with negative energy waves. The presence of absence of resonances and the
existence or nonexistence of a reference frame in which all members of a
5I thank a referee for pointing out that global bundle properties provide another context
where the division between internal and external symmetries can be problematic.
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three-wave resonance have the same energy sign are key factors [Davidson,
1972; Weiland and Wilhelmsson, 1977]. While instability is indeed a serious
possibility, it is not a foregone conclusion in every context. Thus the situation
at the classical level is not entirely clear. Nothing requires the spin 0 field
to have the same mass as the spin 2 [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965], so
there is room to tweak the relativistic dispersion relations. Such numerical
simulations of massive gravity (with 6∞3 degrees of freedom) as have been
done have failed to display the expected instability [Babak and Grishchuk,
2003].
A further question is what becomes of such massive theories under quan-
tization. While one might worry that they suffer from negative energy states
or negative probabilities, that outcome might not be a foregone conclusion.
One possibility worthy of exploration is whether the methods of PT-symmetric
quantization can help. PT-symmetric quantization has exorcised the vicious
ghosts thought to inhabit some theories according to more traditional analy-
ses [Mostafazadeh, 2005; Bender, 2007; Bender and Mannheim, 2008], though
the resulting theories sometimes have surprising phenomenology. Might PT-
symmetric be helpful for massive gravity or for a non-unitary [Delbourgo et al.,
1988] massive Yang-Mills theory?
Massive gravities, being bimetric, are also susceptible to causality problems
if the relationship between the two metrics’ null cones is not correct; sometimes
it is not [Schmelzer, 2000], at least not without help [Pitts and Schieve, 2007].
Though matter sees only the effective curved metric and gravity only barely
sees the flat background metric due to the smallness of the graviton mass, these
theories are only Lorentz-covariant (or covariant under the 15-parameter con-
formal group in the case of massless spin 0). Thus the usual special relativistic
arguments about superluminality in one frame implying backwards causation in
another frame are applicable.
Whether or not massive variants of GTR prove to be viable theories, it
is of considerable interest to add gauge freedom artificially [Schmelzer, 2000;
Arkani-Hamed et al., 2003; Pitts and Schieve, 2007] to massive theories of grav-
ity [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Freund et al., 1969] in order to compare
Einstein’s GTR, massive theories, and massive theories with gauge freedom.
This comparison, the analog of Maxwell vs. Proca vs. Stueckelberg comparison,
juxtaposes the paradigmatic generally covariant theory (GTR), a theory formu-
lation in which general covariance is broken totally but as simply as possible
(massive GTR), and a formulation in which general covariance is in many re-
spects restored artificially (gauged massive GTR). If the massive theories prove
theoretically healthy and empirically viable, then they also pose a case of under-
determination, as in electromagnetism. Whether these theories are physically
viable, however, is not crucial for present purposes.
The gauge freedom to be installed here is external, involving the crucial
transport term
ξα
∂
∂xα
gµν
or the like from the Lie derivative [Sundermeyer, 1982, p. 258], which has no
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analog for electromagnetic or Yang-Mills transformations, in which the deriva-
tive of the potential does not appear. This sort of term is responsible for issues
of space-time point individuation in the hole argument. There have been various
studies that introduce gauge compensation or so-called Stueckelberg fields for
linear theories of spin 2 (and perhaps also spin 0) fields [Delbourgo and Salam,
1975; Hamamoto, 1979, 1996, 1997; Duff et al., 2001; Zinoviev, 2007]. Current
work on higher-spin (that is, higher than the spin 2 of gravity) fields often takes
place in a “gauge invariant” formalism making use of gauge compensation fields
[Buchbinder and Krykhtin, 2005; Buchbinder et al., 2007]. However, it is not at
all clear what form the generalized Stueckelberg trick should take for nonlinear
theories involving spin 2. Indeed one might worry that it would be horribly com-
plicated and involve derivatives to all orders (thus being nonlocal), given the
exponential form of the finite Yang-Mills gauge transformations and given the
presence of derivatives of all orders in finite gauge transformations in gravita-
tion [Grishchuk et al., 1984]. Fortunately the answer is available, painlessly, in
a simple form via parametrization [Schmelzer, 2000; Arkani-Hamed et al., 2003;
Pitts and Schieve, 2007].
Making use of parametrization and some short-cuts, this section will show
in effect what obtains from the application of a BFT-type procedure (modified
as above for Lagrangian-friendliness) to a nonlinear massive theory of gravity,
the FMS theory [Freund et al., 1969; Logunov, 1998]. This theory is in some
respects privileged over other massive gravities [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov,
1965; Ogievetskii and Polubarinov, 1966], though not by virtue of the universal
coupling derivation, which applies to all of the Ogievetsky-Polubarinov theories
[Pitts and Schieve, 2007] (pace [Boulware and Deser, 1972]). Making contact
with parametrization, along with some known results involving the Poisson
bracket algebra for GTR [Sundermeyer, 1982], obviates difficult calculations.
For present purposes the fact that the spin 2-spin 0 theories are related to Ein-
stein’s in the same way that Proca’s is to Maxwell’s trumps any concern (noted
above) that spin 2-spin 0 theories might not be healthy theories of gravity. Con-
verting a nonvariational object to a function of clock fields and their derivatives
is an easy path to the sort of artificial general covariance [Schmelzer, 1998;
Arkani-Hamed et al., 2003; Pitts and Schieve, 2007] that presumably would re-
sult from a more involved BFT-type procedure applied to massive GTR. The
reduction back to the original formulation is accomplished readily by setting,
for example, XM = xµ everywhere. Thus nonvariational fields and clock fields
appear to be inter-convertible. However, if one has introduced gauge freedom
in order to achieve some other goal, such as a consistent notion of causality
[Pitts and Schieve, 2007], then the condition XM = xµ might not be an allowed
gauge condition. Otherwise inter-convertibility seems to hold in general.
An additional philosophical reason to consider versions of gravity with a
non-zero ‘graviton rest mass’ is the way that they exemplify the importance,
as discussed recently by Harvey Brown [Brown, 2005], of giving physical ex-
planations not (or not simply) in terms of space-time structure, but in terms
of detailed physical laws. Massive GTR [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965;
Freund et al., 1969] (forgetting its problems with positive energy and causality
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[Pitts and Schieve, 2007] for the moment) has the Poincare´ group for its sym-
metry group, and yet matter ‘sees’ only the effective curved metric gµν , because
the metric appearing in the matter action is the curved effective metric, not the
flat background ηµν . For sufficiently small graviton rest masses, in practice the
flat background metric is very difficult to observe even in gravitational exper-
iments in these theories, though it is certainly present in the field equations.
The fact that the symmetry group is the Poincare´ group of STR might lead
one to anticipate typical STR phenomenology, in which rods and clocks see the
flat metric, but this anticipation is clearly seen to be false on examination of
the matter action. The “space-time structure” of these theories involves both
a curved metric gµν and a flat metric ηµν , but this mere listing of geometric
objects leaves one with almost no idea what to expect from experiments. Why,
as Brown might ask, does matter see the curved metric and not the flat metric?
Appeal to space-time structure here gives no explanation, but a glance at the
matter action Smatter[gµν , u] (with matter denoted by u) gives a partial answer
immediately: ηµν is absent from the matter action and appears only in the grav-
itational action. (There remains the further question of why matter couples to
gµν in such a fashion that material objects behave as rods and clocks for gµν ,
rather than relating to gµν in some more complicated fashion [Brown, 2005].
6)
These same points apply to massive scalar gravity [Freund and Nambu, 1968;
Pitts, 2009b], which generalize Nordstro¨m’s theory [Deser and Halpern, 1970],
with flat metric ηµν and the merely conformally flat metric gµν conformally re-
lated to it. Matter sees only the conformally flat gµν ; gravity alone involves the
flat metric ηµν , because
√−η appears in the mass term for gravity, but nowhere
else. Massive scalar gravity turns out to be wrong empirically, predicting no
bending of light, but that does not matter for present purposes; unlike massive
GTR, massive scalar gravity is free of worries about positive energy or causal-
ity. The fact that explanations in terms of space-time structure appear to work
so well for STR and GTR is due to the scarcity of geometric objects arguably
pertaining to geometry (as opposed to matter) in the theory, yielding (almost)
unique results for matter coupling and the behavior of the metric. But given
the possibility of writing theories such as massive gravities, or even theories in
which different kinds of matter ‘see’ radically different space-time structures,
explaining physical phenomena in terms of mere space-time structure, without
detailed recourse to the Lagrangian density, is typically an unsuccessful strat-
egy. Poincare´ already considered in principle the idea of a theory with two
conformally related metrics as an argument for the conventionality of geometry
[Poincare´, 1913, pp. 88, 89] [Menahem, 2001]. In the absence of any serious
example, the idea fell by the wayside. However, one need only have done to
Nordstro¨m’s theory what Neumann and Seeliger had done to Newton’s in the
1890s (see [Pauli, 1921; North, 1965; Norton, 1999]) in order to invent massive
scalar gravity. It would be interesting to rationally reconstruct the history of
20th century space-time philosophy with such examples imagined to have been
available by the time that Eddington’s enthusiastic endorsement of geometric
6I thank Katherine Brading for discussing this matter.
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empiricism [Eddington, 1920] appeared.
The treatment of the FMS theory [Freund et al., 1969] in Hamiltonian form
will now be recalled [Boulware and Deser, 1972; Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. The
Lagrangian density is (apart from divergences and other unimportant terms and
an overall factor)
L = √−gR(g)−m2
(
−√−g −√−η + 1
2
√−g gµνηµν
)
. (10)
This Lagrangian density includes a formal cosmological constant term
√−g
and an unimportant constant term
√−η, but the term −m22
√−g gµνηµν breaks
the gauge symmetry by introducing preferred coordinates implicitly. This term
cancels the linear term in the gravitational potential (construed as something
like the difference between the curved and flat metrics), which is responsible
for the peculiar cosmological constant behavior with a potential growing with
distance [Freund et al., 1969]. The distinctive mass term phenomenology, with
Yukawa exponential decay of the potentials, then arises from the quadratic part
of
√−g in the absence of the linear part. It has been suggested from time
to time, going back to Einstein [Einstein, 1923], that the cosmological constant
term itself introduces a mass term for gravity. While that claim is false [DeWitt,
1965; Freund et al., 1969; Treder, 1968; Faraoni and Cooperstock, 1998], it is
evident that the cosmological constant can indeed contribute to a mass term, if
the linear term is cancelled.
Making the usual ADM (3+1)-dimensional split [Misner et al., 1973] of the
curved metric gµν , one uses for dynamical variables the lapse functionN relating
the proper time to coordinate time, the shift vector βi expressing how the spatial
coordinate system moves over time, and a curved spatial metric hij with the
inverse hij and determinant h. Letting gµν be the inverse curved metric as usual,
one has g00 = −N−2, gij = hij , and g0i = hijβj . For temporary convenience I
partly fix the coordinates to have η00 = −1 and η0i = 0. The above Lagrangian
density, after dropping a divergence, becomes
L = N
√
h
[
R+KabK
ab −K2 +m2
(
1− h
ijηij
2
)]
+m2
[
√−η +
√
h
2N
(ηijβ
iβj − 1)
]
.
(11)
The canonical momenta, as in GTR, are
piij =
∂L
∂hij,0
=
√
h(Kij − hijK), Pi = ∂L
∂βi,0
= 0, P =
∂L
∂N,0
= 0. (12)
The four vanishing canonical momenta are primary constraints in constrained
dynamics [Sundermeyer, 1982].
Performing the generalized Legendre transformation and using the primary
constraints gives the canonical Hamiltonian density
H = N
[
H0 +m2
√
h
(
1
2
hijηij − 1
)]
+ βiHi −m2
√−η + m
2
√
h
2N
(1− ηijβiβj),
(13)
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where, as usual,
H0 = 1√
h
(
piijpiij − 1
2
pi2
)
−
√
hR, Hi = −2Djpiji ,
and Dj is the three-dimensional torsion-free covariant derivative compatible
with hij . Setting m = 0 recovers the usual GTR form that is purely a sum of
constraints, but m 6= 0 destroys that form and leads to six, not two, degrees
of freedom at each point in space. The zeroth-order term −m2√−η has been
retained to give Minkowski space-time zero energy. The secondary constraints
are obtained in effect by varying the lapse N and shift vector βi, yielding the
modified Hamiltonian constraint
∂H
∂N
= H0 +m2
√
h
(
−1 + 1
2
hijηij
)
− m
2
√
h
2N2
(1− ηijβiβj) = 0 (14)
and the modified momentum constraint
∂H
∂βi
= Hi − m
2
√
h
N
ηijβ
j = 0. (15)
These constraints are second-class [Pitts, 2006b]. Thus this theory is a gravita-
tional analog of Proca’s massive electromagnetism.
With the BFT procedure as amended above regarding the primary con-
straints and the boundary conditions on the gauge compensation fields, one
should be able to install artificial gauge freedom in the FMS theory in much
the same fashion as in Proca’s electromagnetism, apart from computational dif-
ficulty. The task is easy, however, if one makes use of parametrization. One
need only make the transformation ηµν → XA,µ ηABXB,ν in a single piece of
the mass term, −m22
√−g gµνηµν , the piece that breaks the gauge symmetry,
and the work is nearly finished. Apart from the constant term
√−η which one
leaves alone, one obtains a Lagrangian formally the same as GTR with four
minimally coupled massless scalar fields and a cosmological constant. This La-
grangian density is manifestly coordinate-invariant and has no nonvariational
fields in the action principle, so GTR-type generalized Bianchi identities relat-
ing the Euler-Lagrange equations follow. When the clock fields are expanded
in a background piece and perturbing gauge compensation field, the result at
lowest order resembles the Stueckelberg trick. The fact that the clock fields
look formally like matter fields in the Lagrangian density is a reminder of the
flexibility in deciding which fields pertain to gravity and space-time and which
do not.
While the success of the installation of gauge freedom is already now evident
at the Lagrangian level, it can be displayed perspicuously using the Hamilto-
nian also. Applying the Dirac-Bergmann constrained dynamics procedure to
the result, one readily sees that all constraints are now first-class. The cos-
mological constant term does not affect the Poisson bracket algebra of con-
straints; neither do the minimally coupled scalar fields [Sundermeyer, 1982, p.
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253]. That one of the scalar fields has negative energy is relevant to the via-
bility of the theory, but not to the Poisson bracket algebra. Contrary to the
usual BFT procedure, I require the primary constraints P and Pi and the other
old momenta to suffer no change while gauge freedom is installed. The new
gauge compensation fields, which are clock fields XA,7 have canonical momenta
piA = −m2√−gg0µXB,µ ηBA. Gauge freedom is installed by adding a term to
the Hamiltonian density,
∆H = NH0s + βiHis − m
2
2
√−g gµνηµν , (16)
where
H0s = piAη
ABpiB
2m2
√
h
+
m2
2
XA,i ηABX
B,j h
ij
√
h
and
His = XA,i piA.
The altered Hamiltonian with the unchanged primary constraints gives the new
secondary constraints. They have the same Poisson bracket algebra as vacuum
GTR, one sees without calculation, because neither the cosmological constant,
nor the minimally coupled scalar fields, nor the constant term
√−η changes the
algebra.
Studying the FMS massive theory of gravity and its parametrized vari-
ant has illuminated questions involving empirical equivalence in much the way
that studying the Proca and Stueckelberg massive electromagnetisms illumi-
nated the question of empirical equivalence for electromagnetism. This par-
allel reflects and illustrates and deep technical and conceptual similarities be-
tween Maxwell’s electromagnetism and Yang-Mills theories on the one hand,
and Einstein’s GTR on the other. The FMS theory is distinguished among
the 2-parameter family of massive gravities [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965;
Ogievetskii and Polubarinov, 1966] by its containing the flat metric ηµν to the
first power only, not higher powers or the inverse metric ηµν or the determi-
nant
√−η in the crucial symmetry-breaking term. It is this fact that, after
parametrization, yields the Lagrangian that is formally just four massless scalar
fields (one with the “wrong” sign) with the standard kinetic term. Parametriza-
tion of any of the other OP massive gravities will result in higher powers of ∂X .
Whether the resulting exotic kinetic terms fall within the scope of minimally
coupled matter (as understood at the time of ([Sundermeyer, 1982, p. 253]) is
unclear. Moreover, given the many ways that the lapse N and shift βi and the
field derivatives ∂X enter the Lagrangian densities for most OP theories, finding
the Hamiltonian could be challenging. Thus ascertaining by direct calculation
whether the Poisson bracket algebra has changed could be difficult. Fortunately
it is clear on Lagrangian grounds that the replacement ηµν → XA,µ ηABXB,ν
has the desired effect in these theories also. The manifest coordinate covari-
ance of the Lagrangian density, a weight 1 scalar density with no nonvariational
7In this case the boundary condition of trivializing the new fields means not setting them
to 0, but setting them to equal the coordinates xα.
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fields such as ηµν in the Euler-Lagrange equations, indicates that there will be
generalized Bianchi identities [Sundermeyer, 1982] much as in GTR. One also
knows how to count gauge invariances and degrees of freedom directly from the
Lagrangian [Henneaux et al., 1990; Pons and Shepley, 1995]; doing so gives the
expected results.
Studying the FMS massive theory of gravity and its parametrized variant
has shed light on general covariance. Massive variants of GTR are interesting
because their Lagrangian densities are, except for one term key term, those of
GTR. Thus one can isolate most or all the phenomena of substantive general
covariance or its violation; the absence or presence of a mass term implies the
presence or absence of substantive general covariance, respectively (assuming
that GTR exemplifies it, an assumption that is not quite so obvious after the
Geroch-Giulini
√−g counterexample to the Anderson-Friedman absolute ob-
jects program). Installing artificial gauge freedom by parametrization at least
formally restores many features of GTR that one might associate with substan-
tive general covariance: gauge freedom, first-class constraints, a Hamiltonian
that is a sum of constraints (perhaps apart from a constant in this case), point
individuation questions such as appear in the hole argument, the absence of non-
variational fields in the Lagrangian density (apart from a constant term), etc.
However, parametrized GTR’s gauge freedom is clearly artificial. Apart from
causality worries that appear to problematize gauge-fixing [Pitts and Schieve,
2007] to recover the original FMS formulation, it would be exceedingly natu-
ral to regard the parametrized and non-gauge formulations as the same theory,
much as one might identify the Proca and Stueckelberg formulations of massive
electromagnetism. That parametrization of a non-gauge theory such as FMS
massive gravity can mimic so many features of GTR that one associates with
substantive general covariance tends to confirm that the presence or absence of
clock fields is perhaps the best criterion for deciding whether a formally gener-
ally covariant theory is merely formally generally covariant, or is substantively
so.
The use made of artificial gauge freedom in relation to massive GTR is, I be-
lieve, novel. The original formulation has a subtle but important physical defect
pertaining to causality. By installing formal artificial gauge freedom (neglecting
for the moment whether the resulting configurations are all equivalent), one finds
that some but not all configurations in the enlarged formulation are free of the
defect. Taking the core idea of gauge freedom to involve physical equivalence,
and letting the group structure drop by the wayside as a consequence, one stipu-
lates that gauge transformations are those transformations that relate physically
equivalent configurations, which in these case means configurations with the ap-
propriate causality properties. One therefore obtains a gauge groupoid (in the
sense of Brandt), not a gauge group: the allowed transformations depend on
the configuration in question, so not every gauge transformation can be com-
posed with every other. While in principle one ought to be able to gauge-fix
the resulting formulation, simply turning off the new fields by setting them to
trivial values is not permitted. Sometimes apparently surplus structure isn’t so
surplus after all, even though it remains unobservable.
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6 Generalized BFT Conversion, Unconstrained
Theories, Parametrization and a Further Gen-
eralized Kretschmann Objection
The Einstein-Kretschmann debate over the significance of general covariance
inspires a generalized Kretschmann objection to the idea that any sort of gauge
freedom is physically significant [Martin, 2003]. While philosophers of physics
probably generally believe that one can add gauge symmetries to theory formu-
lations that lack them, there has been rather little discussion of how to do so
explicitly in an interesting way. In BFT conversion, we now have in hand an
algorithm for mounting a generalized Kretschmann objection.
For philosophical and physical purposes, there might be considerable inter-
est in various generalizations of the BFT-type procedure. Why must one be
interested only in converting a theory formulation with only second-class con-
straints into a theory with that same number of first-class constraints and no
second-class constraints? There are physically interesting cases of theories nat-
urally formulated with first- as well as second-class constraints [Park and Park,
1998; Monemzadeh and Shirzad, 2005; Kim et al., 1999]; clearly a generaliza-
tion of the BFT conversion algorithm is required to accommodate such cases.
This generalization, however, is hardly ground-breaking conceptually. There
might also be reasons, however, to perform only a partial conversion, leaving
some second-class constraints and some first-class constraints. Such a proce-
dure might be worthwhile in cases, perhaps such as massive gravity, where
installation of gauge-freedom is made to satisfy an important physical prin-
ciple such as null-cone causality, but one wants to stay as close to the true
degrees of freedom as possible. If some 1960s writers on massive gravity
[Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Freund et al., 1969] had noticed that their
theories were acausal [Schmelzer, 2000; Pitts and Schieve, 2007], perhaps they,
writing before turning second-class constraints into first-class constraints came
to seem like a good idea in general, would have sought such a procedure. There
are also reasons for studying unconstrained theories parametrized with clock
fields, such as a massive scalar field satisfying the Klein-Gordon equation in
Minkowski space-time [Kucharˇ, 1973]. The BFT conversion algorithm takes for
granted that there are second-class constraints that one wants to turn into first-
class constraints, as with massive gravity [Schmelzer, 2000; Arkani-Hamed et al.,
2003; Pitts and Schieve, 2007]; the BFT procedure, strictly construed, is simply
inapplicable to unconstrained theories. One can imagine even more general pos-
sibilities, such as leaving some second-class constraints untouched while adding
gauge freedom elsewhere in a theory, such as by parametrizing the Proca theory.
Kucharˇ and C. L. Stone have taken Maxwell’s electromagnetism, a theory with
first-class constraints, and parametrized it [Kucharˇ and Stone, 1987]. The gen-
eral idea of adding artificial gauge freedom in fact is not tied essentially to the
presence of second-class constraints, or of any constraints at all, in the initial
theory formulation.
A sufficiently general sort of procedure that adds gauge freedom seems to
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be the following. Take a theory formulated in terms of a Hamiltonian (perhaps
starting from a Lagrangian); there need not be any constraints of any kind.
Add a new term (chosen by an educated guess or with sufficient generality) to
the Hamiltonian and perhaps some new constraints (perhaps obtained by start-
ing with the Lagrangian). Run the Dirac-Bergmann stabilization algorithm to
find all the constraints. Gauge freedom has indeed been added if there are at
least some first-class constraint(s) that have no first-class ancestors in the origi-
nal formulation (though there might be second-class ancestors), while retaining
(perhaps under modification) whatever first-class constraints were present in the
initial formulation as well. (The second clause is to ensure that one does not lose
any gauge symmetries in the process, because that seems to violate the spirit of
adding gauge freedom.) Confirm that the new formulation has the same num-
ber of degrees of freedom as the original. Verify that the new formulation can
be gauge-fixed into the original one when the new fields reduce to some trivial
configuration. The successful implementation of this sort of procedure installs
gauge freedom even in theories that perhaps had no constraints initially, such as
if one parametrizes the theory of a massive or massless scalar field. Parametriz-
ing Proca’s electromagnetism, which starts with second-class constraints in the
electromagnetic sector and then acquires first-class constraints pertaining to
space-time, should also fit within this framework. In this fashion one can sub-
sume both the parametrization process and the BFT conversion algorithm into
a more general procedure for adding gauge freedom. Parametrization adds ex-
ternal gauge symmetry to theories that might or might not have any constraints.
The BFT procedure adds gauge freedom, whether internal or external, to the-
ories with second-class constraints. The more general procedure just outlined
adds gauge freedom, whether internal or external or both, to theories that might
or might not have any constraints. Both the BFT procedure and parametriza-
tion are applicable in the case of massive gravity [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov,
1965; Freund et al., 1969], which can be viewed as having a geometrical symme-
try broken by the mass term. The demonstration above that parametrization of
FMS massive gravity yielded just the sort of result that one expects from BFT
(modified concerning the boundary conditions and the distinction between co-
ordinates and momenta) confirms the utility of subsuming both the BFT and
parametrization procedures into a more general field-theoretic technique.
7 Artificial Gauge Freedom and Philosophy
7.1 Post-Positivist Views on Underdetermination: Gly-
mour and Quine
Relatively recent (post-positivist) discussions of underdetermination and empir-
ical equivalence are not entirely unaware of the possibility of adding descriptive
redundancy to theories. According to Sklar,
[t]ypically one can generate alternative theories saving the phenom-
ena by some process which introduces into a theory otiose elements
34
whose place in the theory “cancels out.” Most interesting, of course,
are the historical cases where the theory with the otiose elements
came first and where it was an important scientific discovery that
one could eliminate them by a conceptual revision. [Sklar, 1985, p.
62]
As Sklar’s comment suggests, there is no expectation that introducing such
“otiose” elements might be scientifically productive. Van Fraassen’s versions of
Newtonian mechanics with different velocities for the center of mass of the solar
system (re)introduce a quantity that is unobservable due to the relativity of
motion in the theory [van Fraassen, 1980; Laudan and Leplin, 1991]. While one
might regard the Stueckelberg, BFT and parametrization technologies as intro-
ducing a generalized relativity of motion—that is, of the evolution of fields—
these philosophical discussions do not recognize the technical sophistication that
such introductions might involve, and indeed already had involved, in the physics
literature. Recent discussions of empirical equivalence often imply one or more
claims which now seem doubtful in certain important physical cases. First, the
formulation with the extra entities is often taken to be a different theory from
the original leaner formulation. Second, the formulation with the extra entities
is thought to have no practical advantage over the original leaner formulation.
Third, the formulation with the extra entities is thought to have no concep-
tual advantage over the original leaner formulation. After commenting on the
presence of some or all of these themes in works by Glymour and Quine, I will
recall how each of these claims is at variance with the beliefs and practices of
contemporary physicists working on certain problems.
Quine mentions briefly a possibility that might accommodate the transition
from Proca theories to Stueckelberg theories:
. . . suppose we had an adequate theory of nature, and then we were
to add to it some gratuitous further sentences that had no effect
on its empirical content. By ringing changes on these excrescences
we might get alternative theories, logically incompatible, yet always
empirically equivalent. This gratuitous branching of theories would
be of no interest to the thesis of under-determination, since the ade-
quate original theory was itself logically compatible with each one of
these gratuitous extensions; they were incompatible only with one
another. [Quine, 1975, p. 323]
Taking some Proca theory for the moment as the “adequate theory of nature”—
obviously not a realistic claim, but it does even quantize well—can one take the
Stueckelberg formulation merely to add “some gratuitous further sentences”? If
one makes the field redefinition
A˜µ =def Aµ + ∂µφ,
one can rewrite the Stueckelberg Lagrangian density
Ls = −1
4
FµνF
µν − m
2
2
(Aµ + ∂µφ)(A
µ + ∂µφ).
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in terms of A˜µ and φ, but φ no longer appears in the Lagrangian. While field
redefinitions with derivatives are not to be trusted without question (c.f. the
proof for algebraic redefinitions [Schouten, 1954]), this one seems harmless. The
Euler-Lagrange equations for A˜µ make no reference to φ (because the expression
Aµ + ∂µφ in the mass term yields the same field strength Fµν as results from
Aµ) and are identical to those of the Proca theory (apart from the typography
of A˜µ). This field redefinition can be taken as a reconstrual of predicates that
Quine allows in testing for theoretical equivalence. The new field equation for
φ is vacuous, so one can prescribe φ freely (fix the gauge): the extra field φ ap-
pears solely in “some gratuitous further sentences” with no empirical content.
Thus the application of Stueckelberg’s trick to a Proca formulation fits within
Quine’s discussion.8 While for Quine the Stueckelberg formulation is logically
compatible with the Proca formulation, the Stueckelberg formulation (even af-
ter the field redefinition that reconstrues the predicates) is a different theory
from Proca’s: the Stueckelberg theory posits the existence and certain behavior
of the field φ, whereas the Proca theory does not. The connotations of “gra-
tuitous further sentences” and “ringing changes on these excrescences” indicate
that Quine would have anticipated nothing practically useful or conceptually
insightful to result from the Stueckelberg trick.9
Clark Glymour’s discussion of the underdetermination of geometry (or oth-
erwise) can be substantially carried over to the case of artificial gauge freedom.
Glymour, responding to Reichenbach, invites the reader to
[s]uppose you find yourself teaching high school physics, Newtonian
mechanics in fact. Suppose further than a bright and articulate
student named Hans one day announces that he has an alternative
theory which is absolutely as good as Newtonian theory, and there is
no reason to prefer Newton’s theory of his. According to his theory,
there are two distinct quantities, gorce and morce; the sum of gorce
and morce acts exactly as Newtonian force does. Thus the sum
of gorce and morce acting on a body is equal to the mass of the
8An analogous procedure appears to work for Yang-Mills theories [Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba,
2004], though that is not always obvious [Banerjee and Barcelos-Neto, 1997b]. One should
distinguish between an Abelian-like conversion Aaµ → A
a
µ+∂µφ
a of the Yang-Mills mass term
used by some authors [Umezawa and Kamefuchi, 1961; Salam, 1962] on the one hand, and the
conversion Aaµ → A
a
µ + Dµφ
a resembling a non-Abelian gauge transformation on the other
[Grosse-Knetter, 1993]. The latter has been criticized for not actually converting all second-
class constraints into first-class constraints [Banerjee et al., 1995], contrary to claims made
about it. Given the consequences for counting degrees of freedom and given the interrelation
between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian symmetries [Henneaux et al., 1990], this controversy is
surprising, but I have not attempted to resolve it. For parametrized massive GTR, the relevant
field redefinition is gAB =def g
µνXA,µX
B ,ν and the like; using the preferred coordinates
XA to define the action integral makes the arbitrary label coordinates xµ disappear from the
action.
9Quine’s relativism about ontology and general pro-science naturalistic form of philosophy
[Quine, 1969] are more helpful than the remarks quoted above, as viewed from particle physics.
Confronted with the discussion to follow, he might conclude that at the quantum level, it is
Stueckelberg rather than Proca that gives an adequate theory, in which case my criticisms
become largely inapplicable. I thank Don Howard for discussion.
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body times its acceleration, and so on. Hans demands to know why
there is not quite as much reason to believe his theory as to believe
Newton’s. What do you answer?
I should tell him something like this. His theory is merely an ex-
tension of Newton’s. If he admits that an algebraic combination of
quantities is a quantity, then his theory is committed to the exis-
tence of a quantity, the sum of gorce and morce, which has all of
the features of Newtonian force, and for which there is exactly the
evidence there is for Newtonian forces. But in addition his theory
claims this this quantity is the sum of two distinct quantities, gorce
and morce. However, there is no evidence at all for this additional
hypothesis, and Newton’s theory is therefore to be preferred.. . .
The gorce plus morce theory is obtained by replacing “force” wher-
ever it occurs in Newtonian hypotheses by “gorce plus morce”, and
by further claiming that gorce and morce are distinct quantities nei-
ther of which is always zero.. . . [T]he computations which give values
for force will not give values for gorce or for morce, but only for the
sum of gorce and morce. Indeed, in general if we have a set of simul-
taneous equations such that using these equations, values for some
of the variables in the equations may be determined from values of
other variables, then values for the new variables will not be deter-
mined.. . . Implicit in the discussion is a certain articulation of the
principle that we prefer a theory with fewer untested hypotheses to
one with more untested hypotheses. [Glymour, 1977].
Whether this analogy accurately captures the main issues involved in the ques-
tion of the conventionality of geometry may be doubted [Pitts and Schieve,
2004], but that need not concern us now. It fits well enough the transition from
a Proca formulation to a Stueckelberg formulation of massive electromagnetism
(apart from the assumption of a merely algebraic relation among the fields),
and mutatis mutandis the general process of installing artificial gauge freedom.
It is evident that Glymour considers the gorce plus morce theory distinct from
Newton’s theory, practically in no way advantageous to Newton’s theory, and
conceptually inferior to Newton’s theory. By parity of reasoning, one might
expect a similar verdict from him on the Stueckelberg formulation of massive
electromagnetism and on the results of BFT conversion or parametrization; at
the least, one can imagine that many philosophers, confronted with this exam-
ple, might reason analogously to what Glymour says about gorce plus morce.
Quine and Glymour (and they seem not to be unusual among philosophers)
take the formulations with additional unobservable entities not only to be dif-
ferent (though compatible) theories from the leaner originals, but also to be
practically and conceptually inferior to the leaner originals. By contrast, it is
overwhelmingly taken for granted in the physics literature that the Stueckelberg
formulation is a formulation of the very same theory as the Proca formulation.
More generally, it is overwhelmingly taken for granted that formulations ob-
tained using the BFT algorithm or parametrization are formulations of the
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same theory after the surgery as before. With the possible exception of A. A.
Logunov and his school, no physicist (to my knowledge) regards gauge-fixing as
producing a numerically distinct theory. When gauge freedom has been installed
artificially, as in the Stueckelberg, BFT and parametrization cases, one can elim-
inate the extra fields, the “otiose elements” or “excrescences,” by gauge-fixing.
Whereas physicists agree that the result is the very same theory as before gauge-
fixing, notable philosophers of science have been committed to the view that a
different and superior theory is produced by gauge-fixing. Whereas such philoso-
phers of science would expect the formulations with artificial gauge freedom to
be practically inferior to their leaner ancestors, physicists find artificial gauge
freedom useful in taking the limit of vanishing photon or other particle mass
[Zinoviev, 2007], studying higher spin fields [Buchbinder and Krykhtin, 2005],
avoiding the technical challenges sometimes present with using the true degrees
of freedom by installing gauge freedom artificially [Henneaux and Teitelboim,
1992; Banerjee et al., 1995; Park and Park, 1998], and proving desirable prop-
erties of a physical theory in different gauges, such as unitarity in one gauge and
renormalizability in another [Weinberg, 1996, chapter 21][Kaku, 1993, chapter
10]. On the other hand, if one individuated theories as strictly as do Quine and
Glymour, one would have (at least) a theory that had gauge freedom but was
not obviously unitary or renormalizable, an empirically equivalent but distinct
theory that had no gauge freedom and that was unitary but not obviously renor-
malizable, and a third empirically equivalent but distinct theory that lacked
gauge freedom and that was renormalizable but not obviously unitary. If one
can regard the tetrad-spinor formalism as obtained from the OP spinor formal-
ism by the installation of artificial gauge freedom [Gates et al., 1983, p. 234]
(perhaps in a Lakatosian rational reconstruction of the history of spinors in
curved space-time), then the linearity of the tetrad-spinor formalism is another
practical benefit from artificial gauge freedom. Parametrizing special relativis-
tic theories has been fruitful conceptually in revealing similarities between GTR
and parametrized theories, as the discussion of the suggestion that GTR is “al-
ready parametrized” demonstrated. Parametrizing massive GTR also has the
advantage—it is unclear to what degree it is practical vs. conceptual—of tak-
ing acausal theories and giving them some hope of causality [Pitts and Schieve,
2007]. While this last application does not strictly contradict Quine or Gly-
mour, who assumed that one had an adequate theory at the beginning, it does
exemplify the importance of artificial gauge freedom, contrary to what they
presumably would have expected.
How is it that philosophers of science in the 1970s-80s tended to disagree
with physicists on the value of artificial gauge freedom? One explanation is
that the relevant physics has become prominent only rather recently, perhaps
too recently to have influenced the philosophical works discussed; newer works
will be considered shortly. A deeper reason, however, is that physicists, often
tacitly, ascribe to physical theories an ontology that differs from the prima fa-
cie ontology indicated by the fields in the Lagrangian density. To be specific,
physicists take for granted, and sometimes assert, that the real is the invari-
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ant,10 where the relevant symmetry group (or groupoid [Hahn, 1978; Renault,
1980]) is picked out (primarily) by the symmetries of the action. That only
gauge- and coordinate-invariant entities are considered real, and thus part of a
theory’s ontology, is a limited application of the principle of the identity of indis-
cernibles. Though that principle is rarely invoked by name among physicists, the
idea is ubiquitous. Thus the real ontology of the Stueckelberg formulation does
not include the extra scalar field φ, because φ is “mere gauge” (indeed gauge-
equivalent to 0) and hence unreal or “unphysical.” While the identity of indis-
cernibles is far from obscure among philosophers, recent philosophers of science
who are inclined toward scientific realism have avoided invoking the principle in
some contexts where physicists almost unanimously invoke it. One might take
the modern reemergence of the hole argument in GTR [Earman and Norton,
1987] as evidence of this realism among philosophers of science, though doubt-
less modern mathematicians’ fondness for active diffeomorphisms (which seem
to require mathematical haecceities) has also contributed. To a large degree,
modern physical theories dictate their own ontologies, indicating clearly by the
presence of gauge freedom—especially artificial gauge freedom, which typically
can be removed without spoiling manifest locality [Belot, 2007, p. 190]—when
the naive ontology is not correct. The venerable tradition of trying to express
scientific theories in terms of logic and set theory, as is evident in Quine [Quine,
1975] among others, is rather remote from the language of contemporary physics
[Ladyman et al., 2007]. Thus Quine regards as equivalent two formulations that
are logically equivalent after reconstrual of predicates, but a formulation that
adds superfluous entities with arbitrary values produces, in his view, a different
and inferior theory. While explicitly eliminating superfluous fields is important
for some tasks in the philosophy of physics, such as the Anderson-Friedman ab-
solute objects program discussed elsewhere [Pitts, 2006a, 2008], to some degree
Lagrangian field theory takes care of itself ontologically with the help of the
principle that the real is the invariant. I observe that a de-emphasis on pinning
down the unobservable things posited by scientific theories and greater emphasis
on mathematics is broadly in harmony with structural realism [Worrall, 1989].
7.2 Artificial Gauge Freedom and More Recent Views on
Surplus Structure and Gauge Freedom
In the last few decades, as the philosophy of physics has flourished, philoso-
phers have increasingly wrestled with the significance of gauge freedom and
what Michael Redhead has called “surplus structure” [Redhead, 1975, 1980,
2003], a part of the formal structure without any claimed referent in the world.
Given that gauge transformations make distinctions that correspond to no ob-
servable difference, and plausibly to no real difference of any sort, one might
be tempted to think that reduction to eliminate surplus structure in general,
and gauge freedom in particular, would be the obvious move. Such a move
finds defenders, especially among those who sympathize with Leibniz’s rela-
10Don Howard has called attention to this theme [Howard, 1998].
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tionalism and his principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Gordon Belot has
discussed these matters in detail [Belot, 2000, 2003, 2007]. As noted above,
there are significant technical drawbacks to such reductions, such as obscuring
spatial locality (as well as Lorentz invariance). Thus one might be inclined to
keep the surplus structure and gauge symmetry in place. Less common among
philosophers, however, is the idea that there might be good reasons to expand
the collection of fields used to describe the system. Belot, indeed, has noted
some examples from fluid mechanics where expanding the collection of fields
is advantageous [Belot, 2003]; it is unclear, given the well-known awkwardness
of variational formulations of fluid mechanics, for example, whether this sug-
gestion should be expected to hold for more plausibly fundamental theories,
however. Redhead [Redhead, 2003] and Dean Rickles [Rickles, 2004] have noted
that BRST symmetry, a way of enlarging the space of fields to include a rigid
fermionic transformation that manages to encode a local gauge symmetry, can
be useful. Thus the lesson that enlarging the collection of fields can be bene-
ficial is not quite unknown. BFT conversion and its proposed generalizations
above, however, differ from BRST symmetry. The notion of adding local gauge
symmetries, which we have seen to be common and fruitful in physics, merits
philosophers’ continued attention.
8 Conclusion
Whereas the Anderson-Friedman absolute objects program gives the “wrong”
answer for the general covariance of GTR because of
√−g [Pitts, 2006a; Giulini,
2007], and testing for fields not varied in the action principle appears to give
the right answer for perhaps a wrong reason [Pitts, 2008], converting fields not
varied in an action principle to functions of clock fields and their derivatives
appears to give the expected list of substantively generally covariant theories
for plausibly the right reason. This proposal, which is largely inspired by the
claim that GTR is already parametrized, bears considerable resemblance to
the pre-Kretschmann views of Einstein on GTR’s distinctively lacking preferred
coordinates. One might then view clock fields as a stratagem to deploy in a
Kretschmann-type objection that general covariance is trivial or purely formal,
while taking the absence of clock fields in GTR to show that it, unlike STR,
has no preferred coordinates and ipso facto is substantively generally covariant.
Thus both trivial and substantive general covariance admit clear analyses in
terms of clock fields. The study of massive GTR confirms the utility of using
the absence or presence of clock fields as the criterion for substantive general
covariance.
The discussion of clock fields in the context of general covariance turns out
to involve a special case of artificial gauge freedom, so the same concept sheds
light on general covariance in the philosophy of physics and on underdetermina-
tion in the general philosophy of science. A Lagrangian-friendly modification of
the BFT formalism for converting second-class constraints into first-class con-
straints was suggested above; then one immediately arrives at the Stueckelberg
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formulation starting from the Proca theories, and presumably directly arrives
at parametrized massive GTR when starting with massive GTR. The physics
literature on artificial gauge freedom also proves to admit considerable gener-
alization to cases with no second-class constraints and perhaps no constraints
at all; one need not convert all second-class constraints into first-class con-
straints, either, depending on one’s goals. These techniques provide algorithms
for making generalized Kretschmann-type objections, to the effect that gauge
symmetries are trivial or merely formal.
In addition to providing resources to formulate and generate generalized
Kretschmann objections, these techniques might help to resolve them. Induc-
tion over special features of massive electromagnetism, Yang-Mills theories, and
GTR in the formulations with artificial gauge freedom suggests some criteria
for distinguishing artificial gauge freedom from the ‘natural’ gauge freedom in
the massless cases (apart from the obvious presence of a mass term quadratic
in the potential, which might not generalize). For the massive variants with
artificial gauge freedom, the gauge parameters appear algebraically, so the new
gauge compensation fields have redundant field equations. For the theories with
natural gauge freedom, eliminating gauge freedom tends to produce nonlocal
formulations, whereas the massive theories with artificial gauge freedom can be
gauge-fixed (apart from causality worries for massive gravity) back into local
field theories with no gauge freedom. Whether these differences are the cor-
rect criteria or not, they suggest that there might exist relevant differences that
permit distinguishing artificial gauge freedom from the more familiar natural
sort, in much the way that the claim that GTR is already parametrized sug-
gests that substantive general covariance is formal general covariance achieved
without clock fields. Descriptive redundancy need not be a nuisance. In the
present philosophical contexts, as well as in physics, it is a resource: artificial
gauge freedom sheds light not only on the question of empirically equivalent
theories, but also on general covariance.
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